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Abstract.— In this paper, a continuous-time price-quantity trading process is
defined for exchange economies with differentiable characteristics. The dynamics
is based on boundedly rational agents exchanging limit-price orders to a central
clearing house, which rations infinitesimal trades according to Mertens (2003)
double auction. Existence of continuous trade and price curves holds under weak
conditions, and in particular even if there is no long-run competitive equilibrium.
Every such curve converges towards a Pareto point, and every Paretian allocation
is a locally stable rest-point. Generically, given initial conditions, the trade and
price curve is piecewise unique, smooth, and computable, hence enables to effec-
tively perform comparative dynamics. Finally, in the 2× 2 case, the vector field
induced by the limit-price dynamics is real-analytic.
Keywords: Non-taˆtonnement, Price-quantity dynamics, Limit-price mechanism, My-
opia, Computable General Equilibrium.
Re´sume´.— On de´finit un processus d’e´changes en prix et en quantite´s et en
temps continue, pour des e´conomies diffe´rentiables. La dynamique est fonde´e
sur la rationalite´ limite´e d’agents myopes qui adressent des ordres de prix-limites
qu’ils adressent a` une agence de clearing centrale, laquelle rationne les e´changes
infinite´simaux en fonction de l’enche`re double de Mertens (2003). L’existence
de courbes de prix et d’e´changes est ve´rifie´e sous de faibles conditions, en partic-
ulier en l’absence d’e´quilibre concurrentiel de long-terme. Toute courbe d’e´change
converge vers un optimum de Pareto, et inversement tout optimum est un point
stationnaire localement stable de la dynamique Ge´ne´riquement, a` conditions ini-
tiales donne´es, la courbe d’e´changes et de prix est unique par morceaux, lisse et
calculable, ouvrant la possibilite´ d’une dynamique comparative effective. Enfin,
dans le cas 2×2, le champ de vecteurs associe´ a` la dynamique est re´el-analytique.
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21 Introduction
In this paper, we investigate a continuous-time price-quantity process for pure-exchange
Arrow-Debreu economies with a continuum of traders and finitely many commodities. As
such, this paper takes place within the litterature devoted to the “non-taˆtonnement” ap-
proach1 Real trades are supposed to take place across time, so that, if we allow a passage
of time, and several such, the initial endowment point becomes rapidly lost in the shuﬄe.
Therefore, by contrast with price adjustment processes, the basic notion of steady state can
no longer be provided, in general, by the concept of Walras equilibrium inherited from static
General Equilibrium Theory (GET hereafter). Instead, it is replaced by that of price equi-
librium, i.e., of a Pareto-efficient state sustained by some price equilibrium vector that turns
it into a no-trade competitive equilibrium. As a consequence, since Pareto points are not
locally unique, the uniqueness of trajectories becomes a crucial matter. And there, a new
difficulty must be faced: Indeed, it is easy to show that, given fixed initial conditions, any
continuous ordinary differential equation admits either a globally unique solution trajectory
or infinitely many such solutions (see Appendix 6.1). In other words, the comfortable middle
ground obtained within the static framework, where the set of static equilibria is shown to
be generically finite, cannot have any counterpart in non-taˆtonnement dynamics. It is there-
fore not a surprise if all the non-taˆtonnement processes we are aware of exhibit some kind
of strong indeterminacy. To take but two examples, Schecter (1977) proved that, for every
initial condition, every point in the contract curve is a rest-point of some solution to Smale’s
(1976) price-adjustment process; a similar accessibility result was proven by Bottazzi (1994)
for Champsaur & Cornet (1990)’s refinement of Smale’s process. In either case, one can make
no prediction as to where on the optimal set a sequence of trades beginning at some initial
endowment ω will end, except that it will end at a point that is (weakly) preferred to ω by
every agent.
In this paper, we propose a variant of Smale’s (1976) and Champsaur & Cornet’s (1990)
price-quantity adjustment processes that aims at solving the problems just outlined. Traders
are boundedly rational, so that they do not aim to instantaneously maximize their long-run
utility function (or the utility of their own clients if they are, say, middlemen acting for a
clientele). Rather, they try to move their portfolio in the direction inducing the steepest
increase of their (current) utility. To put our formalism yet another way: at every instant
of time t, agents play in a (linear) marginal economy, where they exchange infinitesimally
small amounts of commodities so as to maximize their short-term, marginal (linear) utility
function. The economic rationale for such a myopic behavior is not new: On the one hand, it
makes sense to assume that, on the very short-run, people behave as if they were risk-neutral.
On the other hand, even chess International Grandmasters do not calculate more than four or
five moves ahead, and it has been argued that, under quite reasonable circumstances, seeing
further into the future does not mean seeing better.2 As for the micro-structure of infinitesi-
mal trades, it mimics that of financial markets: Traders anonymously send limit price orders
to a central clearing house. Hence, they even need not know with whom they are trading.
A rationing function — namely Mertens’ (2003) limit-price mechanism — instantaneously
matches demand and supply. Once markets operated at time t, new bids and offers are made
at t+ dt, which automatically replace those just sent. The main results are as follows:
1) Existence of solution trajectories is guaranteed under fairly weak assumptions — in
particular without strict monotonicity or boundary conditions on utilities, or else without
any survival restriction on initial endowments. We exhibit examples where static Walras
equilibria fail to exist, and yet our dynamics admits solution paths. Moreover, every solution
path admits some price-equilibrium as cluster-point. Conversely, price equilibrium is locally
stable3 for our dynamics. This leaves open the possibility that a solution trajectory circles
infinitely many times around a price equilibrium.
1See Hahn (1971), Jordan (1986) and Herings (1995) for early surveys.
2See, e.g., Gray & Geanakoplos (1991) and the literature therein.
3Local stability means that every solution curve that does not start too far away from a given rest point
remains in a neighborhood of it.
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2) Our non-taˆtonnement process works with myopic (but rational) traders who need only
know the local shape of their indifference manifolds, and publicly observe prices at each point
in time. On the other hand, at variance with, e.g., Kumar & Shubik (2002), the rules of the
game to which consumers take part are independent from the characteristics of its players.
3) For a generic choice of utilities and initial endowments, we get the (global) uniqueness
of the solution path to the corresponding Cauchy’s problem within a certain time interval
[0, ε) (ε > 0). Moreover, the restriction to that time interval [0, ε) of every such solution
path is smooth, and depends smoothly upon initial conditions. Put differently, the feasible
set admits a partition into an open and dense subset of “regular” economies (for which the
vector field of our dynamics is real-analytic) and a finite union of low-dimensional, smooth,
critical submanifolds (with empty interior). When the trajectory of trades happens to cross
non-transervally such a critical submanifold — and only under such exceptional circumstances
— smoothness and/or uniqueness of the trade and price curve may fail. On the other hand,
for every economy involving two households and two goods, the vector field associated to our
dynamics is real-analytic on the whole interior of the feasible set.
4) Every trajectory can be effectively computed, which is a must for dynamic comparative
purposes. We do not address this last issue in its full scope in the present paper, but content
ourselves with fully characterizing all the portrait phases of our dynamics in the Edgeworth
box of 2 × 2 economies. In particular, we show that the vector field is real-analytic. A
companion article will offer the general algorithm and provide experimental evidence for the
N × L case.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section details the basic assumptions maintained
throughout, and introduce the notion of marginal economy. Section 3 defines the limit-price
exchange process. The basic existence, convergence, uniqueness, regularity and stability
results are proven in section 4. Section 5 deals with the peculiar 2 × 2 case. The last
section provides an interpretation of the game-theoretic micro-structure underlying the whole
dynamics, and concludes. An Appendix provides some additional material of technical nature.
2 The model
In this section, we first lay out the basic assumptions that we will maintain throughout, and
start constructing the limit price exchange process.
2.1 The large long-run economy
Let us consider a pure exchange Arrow-Debreu economy E := (X,u, ω) with C ≥ 1 commodi-
ties, and populated by a continuum of consumers. For simplicity, we take
(
[0, 1],B([0, 1], λ)
to be the measured space of traders, where B denotes the Borel tribe, and λ the restriction
of the Lebesgue measure to the real interval [0, 1]. Each household i ∈ [0, 1] is characterized
by her ¿consumption set Xi = RC+, her initial endowment ωi ∈ Xi and her utility function
ui : Xi → R. The endowment map ω : [0, 1] → RC is assumed to be integrable, and there
is no loss of generality in postulating that every commodity is present in the economy, i.e.,
ω :=
∫
[0,1] ωidλ(i) >> 0. We assume that there are only finitely many types of utilities:
the map i 7→ ui is a simple function ui =
∑H
h=1 uh1{Ah}(i), where for all h, Ah ∈ B([0, 1]),
Ah ∩ Ah′ = ∅ if h 6= h′ and ∪hAh = [0, 1]. Thus, from the point of view of preferences, the
economy admits only N ≥ 1 types of agents.
An allocation is a measurable map x : [0, 1]→ RC belonging to the feasible set τ :
τ :=
{
x ∈ L1([0, 1],RC+) : ∫
[0,1]
xidλ(i) = ω
}
.
An allocation x is individually rational whenever ui(xi) ≥ ui(ωi) a.e. i. We denote by
τ∗ ⊂ τ the subset of feasible and individually rational allocations, by Xˆ := {x ∈ RC+ : x ≤ ω}
4the set of individually feasible bundles, and by Xˆh := {x ∈ Xˆ : uh(x) ≥ uh(ωh)} ⊂ Xˆh the
projection on Xh of the subset of individually rational and feasible allocations.
Throughout the paper, a long-run economy E will be assumed to verify:
Assumption (C). For every type h,
(i) the restriction uh|Xˆh(·) of uh(·) to the subset Xˆh is C1, quasi-concave, weakly in-
creasing and admits no critical point (i.e., the utility gradient verifies ∇uh|Xˆh(·) >
0).
(ii) For every allocation x ∈ τ∗ and commodity c, there exists some type h such
that ∂uh∂xc (xh) > 0.
(iii) Let Xˇh denote the intersection, ∂RC+ ∩ Xˆh, of the boundary ∂RC+ with the
subset of individually feasible bundles of household h. For each xh ∈ Xˇh, ∇uh(xh)·
xh > 0.
Assumptions (i) and (ii) are fairly standard. (iii) implies that no household admits sati-
ation points on the boundary of its long-run consumption set intersected with its subset of
feasible and individually rational bundles. The dynamics will be homogeneous with respect to
prices, which are therefore normalized into the closed unit simplex ΣC+ :=
{
p ∈ RC+ |
∑
k pk =
1
}
.
2.2 Marginal economies
The first building block of our dynamics is the marginal economy — or, equivalently,
“short-term” or even “tangent economy” — which will be attached to each allocation x(t) ∈ τ .
For technical reasons (cf. Remark 2.3.2 below), it will be convenient to consider the more
general setting of large, linear economies L with a continuum of preferences. In L, trades
are computed as net trades. Hence, every trader’s i consumption set is the shifted cone
−e(i) + RC+, where e(i) plays the role of a short-sale bound for agent i. Trader’s i linear
utility is given by xi 7→ bi · xi. Finally, her initial endowment vector is 0.
Definition 2.2.1. A linear economy L = (I, I, µ, b, e) is defined by a positive,
bounded measure space (I, I, µ) of traders, and measurable functions b, e : I →
RC+, e being integrable.
We can now introduce:
Definition 2.2.2. The marginal economy Tx(t)E is a linear economy, defined,
in state x(t) ∈ τ , by:
Tx(t)E :=
(
[0, 1],B([0, 1]), λ, g, x
)
where
i) For every agent i, her consumption set is the shifted non-negative
orthant −xi(t) + RC+, with xi(t) playing the role of an (endogenous)
lower constraint on (infinitesimal) short sales;
ii) ∀h, gh(x(t)) := ∇xuh(xh(t))|∇xuh(xh(t))| (normalized gradient) represents her
short-term, linear utility.
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Observe that, in a marginal economy, trades are net. Hence, feasibility of infinitesimal
trades means: ∫
[0,1]
x˙i(t)dλ(i) = 0.
Consequently, at least when there only finitely many types h of current endowments (i.e.,
when x is a simple function), and for x in the interior, τ˚ , the set of feasible infinitesimal
trades belongs to the tangent space of τ at x:4
Txτ :=
{
x˙ ∈ (RC)N | ∑
h
x˙h = 0
}
.
3 Infinitesimal trades
At each time t ≥ 0, candidates for infinitesimal trades and prices (x˙(t), p(t)) = (x˙i(t))i∈[0,1], p(t))
will be marginal outcomes induced by the local interaction of traders in the marginal economy
Tx(t)E . This outcome will provide the direction in which the state of the underlying economy
E starting from x(t) will move at time t in the configuration space τ . Since, it will be taken
as fixed, and for notational convenience, we drop the time parameter t in this subsection.
A preliminary step for defining a short-term outcome is to start with an intermediary
solution concept, interesting in its own right, namely that of a pseudo-outcome.5 At a pseudo-
outcome, only commodities with non-zero prices and only agents with non-zero marginal
utilities trade. All agents who have a non-zero initial short-sale bound for at least one
commodity with non-zero price maximize their marginal utility subject to their (infinitesimal)
budget constraint. Finally, for a commodity to have a zero pseudo-outcome price, it must be
the case that all agents whose short-sale lower bound has a positive value (according to this
very pseudo-outcome price) have a zero marginal utility for this good. Formally, we get:
Definition 3.1. (Mertens (2003)) A pseudo-outcome of TxE is a price system
p ∈ RC+ \ {0} and a feasible infinitesimal trade x˙ ∈ L1([0, 1],−x+RC+) verifying:
(i) For every agent i, p · gi = 0 implies x˙i = 0.
(ii) For every i, x˙i maximizes gi · x˙ subject to the (infinitesimal) budget con-
straints:
p · x˙ ≤ 0, x˙ ≥ −xi and
(
pc = 0⇒ x˙c = 0
)
. (1)
(iii) For every commodity c, pc = 0 implies that, for λ-a.e. i,
(
p · xi > 0 ⇒
gci (xi) = 0
)
.
P (TxE) will denote the set of pseudo-outcome prices, and for all p ∈ P (TxE), Xp(TxE)
the corresponding set of pseudo-outcome allocations. Needless to say, pseudo-outcomes bear
a strong relationship with static Walras equilibria. Subsection 6.2 of the Appendix pro-
vides some hints about this relationship. However, the following example already shows that
pseudo-outcomes have a strong advantage over competitive equilibria: they exist even when
the marginal economy TxE fails to verify the usual survival assumption:
Example 3.1. Take a marginal economy with two types of households, and C = 2,
g1 = x1 = (1, 0), g2 = (0, 1), e2 = (2, 3). This economy admits no Walras equilibrium, but
the unique pseudo-outcome is no-trade together with the price vector p∗ = (0, 1).
4See the Appendix for the tangent space of the submanifold with corners τ .
5We prefer this terminology to the term “pseudo-equilibrium” used (with the same definition) by Mertens
(2003) in order a) to stress that it is not the result of any equilibrating coordination among market players,
but it is rather part of the construction of a rationing function; b) to avoid any overlaps with the meaning
usually given to this word in (static) incomplete markets GET.
63.1 Short-term outcomes
Unfortunately, pseudo-outcome do not quite suffice to provide a convenient solution concept
for marginal economies. Indeed, linear economies may well exhibit a continuum of pseudo-
outcomes6. In order to circumvent the problem, Mertens’ (2003) idea consists in adapting
the rule used in many “real” market places in order to execute several orders placed at
the same limit-price. The proportional rule will provide us with the desired uniqueness. (Its
interpretation will become clearer once we introduce the game-theoretic framework underlying
the micro-structure of marginal trades.) Let us denote by r(gi, `, k) :=
g`i
gki
the marginal rate
of substitution of agent i between commodities ` and k (with the convention g0 := 0). The
competitive demand set of i at price p is:
δip :=
{
` ∈ NC | p` ≤ r(gi, `, k)pk, for every commodity k
}
.
With this notation in hand, we can now define:
Definition 3.1.1. (Mertens (2003)) A pseudo-outcome is proportional if for
every pair of commodities c, c′ with non-zero prices, there exists a non-negative
number mcc′ such that:
a) mcc′ +mc′c > 0;
b) mc1c2mc2c3mc3c4 = mc1c3mc3c2mc2c1 (consistency);
c) all agents i with non-zero marginal utility and with δip 3 {c, c′} receive c and
c′ in quantities proportional to mcc′ and mc′c.
The two following examples illustrate the proportional rule at work.
Example 3.1.1. There are two commodities, x and y. The marginal economy is defined
by g1 = g2 = (1, 1), e1 = (2, 1), e2 = (1, 3). P (L) = {(1, 1)}. The weights are: mxy = 3 and
myx = 4, and the proportional pseudo-outcome is: x∗1 = (
9
7 ,
12
7 ), x
∗
2 = (
12
7 ,
16
7 ).
re
rx∗
Fig 3.2.1. The proportional rule.
Example 3.1.2. e1 = (1, 2) = g2, e2 = b1 = (2, 1). In this peculiar situation, the unique
proportional pseudo-outcome coincides with the unique Walras equilibrium x˙∗ = (x∗1, x∗2) =
6This should not come as a surprise: Dubey (1982) suggested, within the set-up of price-quantity strategic
market games, that any fixing market should encounter this indeterminacy problem.
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(
(3, 0), (0, 3)
)
. The proportional rule does not need to be put into practice because condition
c) of Def. 3.2.1. is not satisfied.
We are now ready to define the short-term outcome of a marginal economy TxE — hence
the vector field of our dynamics.
Definition 3.1.2. (Mertens (2003)) (i) A short-term outcome of TxE is de-
fined by the following algorithm: Pick any proportional pseudo-outcome, settle
the corresponding trades. Next, consider the linear sub-economy L′ obtained by
restricting TxE to the commodities that had zero price. Pick again a proportional
pseudo-outcome of this sub-economy, and settle the corresponding trades. Repear
the procedure until the algorithm ends.
(ii) If “proportional” is dropped from the preceding definition, we get only a
quasi-outcome.
Let Π
(
TxE
)
denote the set of short-term prices of the marginal economy TxE , and for
each pi ∈ Π(TxE), let Xpi(TxE) be the corresponding short-term allocation. Uniqueness of
the short-term price is not always guaranteed, as shown by the following example:
Example 3.1.3. g1 = e1 = (1, 0); g2 = e2 = (0, 1). The set of short-term prices is R2++,
while the unique short-term outcome is no-trade.
But this is actually the exception, and uniqueness is the rule, as shown by the next result.
In order to understand under which (exceptional) circumstances, non-uniqueness may be
met, let us define as splitting procedure the operation that consists in in associating to a
marginal economy TxE an auxiliary, linear economy TˇxE obtained as follows: Each household
i of TxE is splitted into C fictitious agents (ic)c=1,...,C , each of them being characterized by:(
gic , eic) := (gi, (0, ..., 0, e
c
i , 0, ..., 0)
)
,
where eci stands in the c
th position. Thus, in TˇxE , every fictitious agent ic can sell only one
type of good, namely commodity c.7 Every trade x˙ in TxE induces a trade in TˇxE , that we
still denote x˙ (no confusion should occur).
Let us call strict a trade in TˇxE that does not take some commodity from one (fictitious)
agent in order to give it to another in exchange for something to which the donor attributes
zero marginal utility. Formally,8 a feasible trade x˙ in TxE is strict if, for every ic, either
x˙ic ≥ 0 or gic · (x˙ci+ eic) > 0. An inspection of Example 3.1.2 above reveals that no-trade is
Pareto-efficient with respect to strict trades. In other words, in this marginal economy, the
unique way to Pareto-improve the status quo would consist in performing non-strict trades.
Let us denote by ΘTxE the set of such allocations in TxE that turn out to be Pareto-efficient
when efficiency is checked only with strict trades.
Theorem 3.1.1 (Mertens (2003, Thm 6 of section VIII)) Under (C), Every
marginal economy TxE admits a unique short-term allocation (i.e., ∪pi∈Π(TxE)Xpi(TxE)
is a singleton), while Π(TxE) is a cone. Except when 0 ∈ ΘTxE , Π(TxE) reduces
to a singleton.
This means that our dynamics can be defined by a vector field in the allocation space,
and, in the price space, by a cone field that reduces to a vector field except on states x∗ ∈ τ∗
for which the attached marginal economy Tx∗E is such that 0 ∈ ΘTx∗E .
7See section 6 infra for a game-theoretic interpretation and rationale for the splitting procedure.
8This is Definition 11 in Mertens (2003) recast in our framework, and augmented according to Remark (2)
p. 467.
83.2 Trade and price trajectories
We are now ready to define trade and price trajectories of the long-run economy.
A trajectory of the long-run economy E is a map φ : [a, b) ⊂ R → τ × ΣC+, where
φ(t) = (x(t), p(t)) is the state of the economy E at time t ∈ [a, b). A trajectory decomposes
itself into a trade curve x : [a, b) → τ , and a price curve p : [a, b) → ΣC+.9 A trade curve
φ : [a, b)→ τ is admissible provided
(a) it involves only trades that are individually rational, i.e., ddtui(xi(t)) = ∇ui(xi(t))·
x˙i(t) ≥ 0, a.e. i and all t ∈ [a, b), with at least one strict inequality for a non-
negligible subset of agents i and all t;
(b) x(·) never leaves τ .10
A solution to the limit-price exchange dynamics can now be defined as:
Definition 3.2.1 A limit-price trajectory is a “solution” of the following
differential inclusion equation:
x(0) = ω, and
x˙(t) = Xpi
(
Tx(t)E
)
, for some pi ∈ Π(Tx(t)E), (2)
p(t) ∈ Π(Tx(t)E . (3)
Each trader’s behavior in a marginal economy only depends upon her normalized utility
gradient, which can be geometrically viewed as the normal unit vector to her indifference
submanifold. As a consequence, the whole limit-price exchange dynamics is ordinal. In the
preceding definition, however, we left unspecified what we mean by a “solution”. We now turn
to this point. Unfortunately, the vector field x 7→ Xpi
(
Tx(t)E
)
turns out to be discontinuous in
general. Indeed, even in the 2×2 case, and even if x(t) converges toward some Pareto-efficient
allocation, one may have a “jump” in the short-term allocation associated to the limit, due
to the use of the proportional rule.
Example 3.2.1. (Mertens (2003)) g1 = (1, 1), e1 = (ε, 1), g2 = (1, ε), e2 = (1, 1). For
ε > 0, the final utility levels induced by the unique short-term outcome are g∗ε1 = 2 and
g∗ε2 = 1 + ε.
s
e
s
x∗
Fig. 3.4.1. Discontinuity of Xpi
9In Smale (1976) the term “trade curve” designates every path in the feasible set along which every agent’s
utility increases in a non-degenerate manner. Here, we use this term in a broader sense, but it will turn out
that all our trade curves are “trade curves” in Smale’s narrow sense.
10More precisely, if, at x(a) ∈ ∂τ , τ is locally described by ρβ(x(a)) = 0, β = 1, ..., k (cf. (17) in the
Appendix), then there is a neighborhood J of t0 in (a, b) so that
d
dt
ρβ(x(t)) ≥ 0, for t ∈ J .
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At the limit as ε→ 0, however, the short-term outcome at the limit induces g∗01 = g∗02 = 0,
hence is not the limit of short-term outcomes of Figure 3.4.1, even in terms of utility levels.
As a consequence, we need to use a well-suited concept of solution trajectory. Consider a
differential inclusion
x˙(t) ∈ f(x(t)), (4)
where f : Rm ⊂→ Rm is a measurable cone field.
Definition 3.2.2. (Filippov (1988))
A Filippov solution of (4), is an absolutely cointinuous trajectory φ : [a, b) →
such that, for a.e. t ∈ [a, b),
φ˙(t) ∈ Ff (φ(t)) := ∩ε>0 ∩A∈N co
{
y | d(y, f(φ(t))) < ε, y /∈ A}, (5)
where N stands for the family of (Lebesgue) negligible subsets of Rm.
In words, a path φ is a solution of (4) if it is absolutely continuous and if, for almost all
t ∈ [a, b), and for arbitrary ε > 0, the vector ddtφ(t) belongs to the smallest convex closed set
containing all the values of the sets f(y), when y ranges over almost all of the ε-neighborhoods
of x, i.e., the entire neighborhood except possibly for a set of Lebesgue measure zero. See the
Appendix in order to grasp some intuition about how Filippov’s solution concept works. We
can now complete our definition of strategy-proof trade curves by replacing the unspecified
word “solution” with Filippov solution in Definition 3.3.2. above.
4 Convergence, uniqueness and regularity
4.1 Existence
Our first task is to prove that limit-price trajectories do exist.
Theorem 4.1.1.— Under (C)(i)-(ii), for every initial endowment ω ∈ τ , and
every T > 0, the family of limit-price trajectories Fω of E is a non-empty, com-
pact, connected, acyclic subset of C0([0, T ], τ). The correspondence ω 7→ Fω is
upper semi-continuous.
Proof. We first reduce every marginal economy TxE to a finite-dimensional one, prove
existence in this finite-dimensional setting, and then show that there was no loss of generality
in the “reduction”.
For this purpose, given TxE , consider the auxiliary linear, finite-dimensional economy
populated with N agents h, each of them having uh : Xh → R as utility and
xh :=
∫
Ah
xidλ(i) ∈ RC+
as current endowment. As a consequence, the short-sale constraint of every agent of type h is
given by −xh. Let us call it the tangent economy associated to x ∈ τ , and denote it by TxE .
From now on, we consider the dynamics obtained by replacing every marginal economy by its
corresponding finite-dimensional tangent economy. Given a tangent economy L ∈ (RCN+ )2,
its short-term outcome can be described by means of a finite number of polynomial equalities
and/or inequalities (equivalently, by a first-order formula over the real field R). Thus, it
follows from Tarski-Seidenberg theorem (cf. Bochnak et alii (1998)), that the correspondence
ϕ is semi-algebraic. Consequently, it is Borel-measurable. Existence of Filippov solutions
to (2) therefore boils down to that of an absolutely continuous solution to the differential
inclusion (5).
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But the set-valued map Fϕ is easily seen to be upper semi-continuous, non-empty-, convex-
, and compact-valued, and locally bounded. In particular, local boundedness comes from the
fact that, ϕ(s(t)) being feasible in TxE , it is uniformly bounded. Observe, indeed, that,
for every x ∈ τ , τTxE is some compact, finite-dimensional set independent of x. On the
other hand, the graph of Fϕ is the closure of the graph of the set-valued map ϕ(s(·)), and
is therefore closed. Upper semi-continuity then follows, e.g., Filippov (1988, Lemmata 14
and 15 p. 66). Thus, the Theorem will be a consequence of a classical existence result for
differential inclusions, e.g., in Aubin & Cellina (1984 chap. 2) provided we can show that
there was no loss in replacing every marginal economy by its corresponding tangent one.
Indeed, the necessary and sufficient first-order conditions of linear programming ensures
that the Walrasian demand at price p of each individual i in TxE is given by:
di(x, p) :=
{
x˙ ∈ Argmax gi(xi) · y˙ s.t. p · y˙ ≤ p · 0 and y˙ ≥ −xi
}
= co
{p · xi
pc
1c ∀c ∈ δip
}
where 1c := (0, ..., 1, ...0) ∈ RC+ with 1 standing in the cth position. Now, given the unique
short-term outcome (x˙, p) =
(
(x˙h)h, p
)
of TxE , consider the allocation in the short-run econ-
omy TxE defined by:
x˙i :=
p · xi
p · xh x˙h (6)
for every i of type h. It is easy to verify that
(
(x˙i)i, p
)
is a short-term outcome of the short-run
economy TxE . By uniqueness of the short-term outcome for every linear economy (Theorem
3.2.1 supra), (6) is but the short-term outcome of TxE . Clearly, the map i 7→ x˙i is Borel,
so that we can repeat the whole argument stated above after having replaced the tangent
economy TxE by its infinite-dimensional counterpart TxE . Hence, the theorem.
¤
The following example illustrates the fact that limit-price trajectories exist even when
static Walras equilibria fail to exist.
Example 4.1.1. There are two commodities x, y in E , two types of households both
in preferences and endowments h = 1, 2, with u1(x, y) = x, u2(x, y) = y, ω1 = (1, 0), while
ω2 = (2, 3).
rω
Fig. 4.1.1 Existence of solutions, non-existence of Walras equilibria
The long-run economy E is already linear, and hence coincides with TωE (and with TxE for
every x ∈ τ∗). Moreover, E admits no Walras equilibrium, and TωE admits a unique short-
term outcome, which is no-trade. Thus, E admits a unique limit-price trajectory, which is
degenerate and reduces to the initial point {ω}. The set of short-term prices is then R2+.
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The next major theoretical question that should now be answered is wheter limit-price
trajectories converge towards Pareto-optimal allocations. The last example shows that this
is not the case, in general, unless one slightly modifies the concept of Pareto-optimality. It
turns out that the restriction to strict infinitesimal trades suffice to restore the convergence
of limit-price trajectories towards “efficient” final allocations.
4.2 Strict infinitesimally optimal allocations
In example 4.1.1., the unique Pareto trade (in the mere sense) that could be implemented
in the marginal economy TωE is x˙∗ = ((3, 0), (0, 3)). Implementing this outcome (resp. any
feasible trade that Pareto-dominates the no-trade outcome, i.e., any point on the segment
[e, x˙∗]) would require to take 2 units (resp. a positive amount) of commodity x from the
splitted agent whose short-sale bound is (2, 0) and marginal utility (0, 1)11, and to give them
to the agent with characteristics bi = ei = (1, 0). But this would induce a zero final utility
to the donor, hence cannot be part of a strict trade. Thus, among the subset of strict trades,
no-trade (that is, the unique pseudo-outcome of this economy) is indeed Pareto-optimal. It
is not difficult to see, in addition, that it belongs to the core of this 4-agent economy.
This later property is actually general (Mertens (2003, Prop. 14)). For our purposes, it
suffices to put on the record that the unique (µ-a.e. sense) profile of utility levels (gi · x˙i)i∈I
induced by pseudo-outcomes (x˙i)i in a linear economy L belongs to the core of L, when the
core is computed with strict trades. Therefore the unique short-term outcome of a linear
economy is Pareto-optimal when optimality is checked with respect to strict trades. Let
ΘL denote the set of Pareto-optimal trades with respect to strict trades. When do mere
Pareto-efficiency and Pareto-efficiency in strict trades coincide ? Even when ei >> 0 for
every “agent” i or even if L is weakly irreducible, Pareto-optimality in terms of strict trades
does not imply mere Pareto-optimality, as shown by the next example:
Example 4.2.1 g1 = (0, 0), g2 = e1 = e2 = (1, 1). Here, e ∈ ΘL but is not Pareto-optimal.
However, if gi · ei > 0 for a.e. i, then every individually rational trade in τL is strict since
every such trade verifies gi · x˙i > 0, so that ΘL coincides with the set of infinitesimal trades
that are Pareto-optimal in L.
Returning, now, to the long-run economy E , a point x ∈ τ is infinitesimally optimal if
no admissible trade curve passes through x without stopping at x. Let θ ⊂ τ be the (closed)
subset of infinitesimally optimal allocations,12 and θ its relative interior. An admissible trade
curve φ : [a, b) → τ is strictly admissible whenever φ′(a) is a strict trade in Tφ(a)E . We
denote by Θ ⊃ θ (resp. Θ∗ ⊃ θ∗) the set of feasible (resp. feasible and individually rational)
points x ∈ τ such that no strictly admissible trajectory passes through x. We call it the set
of strict infinitesimally optimal allocations. Obviously, when E is linear (say, equal to L), Θ
coincides with ΘL. In the next Lemma, given here for the sake of completeness, no boundary
condition is imposed.
Lemma 4.2.1— Under (C)(i) and if every uh is strictly quasi-concave on Xh
(h = 1, ..., N), θ coincides with the set of (global) Pareto optima. If, in addi-
tion, (C)(iii) is in force, Θ∗ coincides with the set of individually rational Pareto
optima.
Proof. That θ ⊂ Θ is obvious. Conversely, let y ∈ Θ, y ∈ τ with ui(yi) ≥ ui(xi)
almost everywhere, the inequality being strict for a non-null subset J ⊂ I. Let [x, y] denote
the straight line segment joining x and y in the convex set τ . This segment determines
line segments [xi, yi] ⊂ RC+, for every i. After having permuted, if necessary, the indices
11Remember that strictness of trades is checked on the splitted economy (as defined in Def. ??). Here, the
splitted economy admits 4 agents.
12Closedness of θ is proven in Schecter (1977).
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of the players, suppose y1 6= x1. Since u1(y1) ≥ u1(x1), it follows from the strict quasi-
concavity that, if z1 belongs to the relative interior of [x1, y1], then u1(z1) > u1(x1). Let z
be a point in [x, y] with first coordinate z1. The quasi-concavity of preferences implies that
uh(zi) ≥ uh(xi) for a.e. i of type h, and for every type h. Consider the path φ : [0, c) → τ
defined by φ(t) = (1− t)x+ tz, to get a contradiction.
If, in addition, preferences of household h are strictly monotone on Xˇh, then every trade
in τ∗ will be strict. Hence, Θ∗ ⊂ θ. The conclusion then follows from the first part of the
Lemma.
¤
Having depicted the “landscape” of “interesting” allocations in τ , we are now ready to
focus on convergence of limit-price trajectories towards such allocations.
4.3 Convergence
Usually, some kind of interiority of endowments or some boundary condition or some strict
monotonicity of preferences is assumed in order to prove convergence of non-taˆtonnement
processes towards efficient states. Here, none of these restrictions will be made. However,
in order to prove that trade curves converge towards allocations in Θ, we do need a weak
additional assumption, which we call “dynamic weak irreducibility”.13 To understand this
assumption, consider the following linear economy:
Example 4.3.1. There are C = 2 commodities, and 2 types of agents both in preferences
and endowments, g1 = (1, 1), g2 = (1, 0), e1 = (0, 2), e2 = (3, 1).
r e = X
Fig. 4.2.1. X /∈ θ
Here, the unique pseudo-outcome of this economy involves no-trade, while every point
on the top horizontal segment {x ∈ τ : x22 = 0} is Pareto-optimal. However, no-trade is
Pareto-optimal in strict trades.
A linear economy L = (I, I, µ, b, e) is “weakly reducible” if there exists a partition
A ∪B = NC such that for a.e. “agent” i, either biβ = 0 ∀β ∈ B, or eiα = 0 ∀α ∈ A, and there
exists some triple (i0, β, α) with ei0β > 0, b
i0
β = 0 and b
i0
α > 0. The linear economy of Example
4.2.1 above is weakly reducible. Prop. 17(b) in Mertens (2003) implies that the set of linear
economies that are weakly irreducible is a Gδ-dense subset of the space of linear economies, so
weakly reducible ones are indeed very exceptional. However, this does not impy that generic
long-run economies will exhibit limit-price trajectories that almost never meet any weakly
reducible marginal economy. Thus, we find it simpler to assume:
13The link between “dynamic weak irreducibility” and classical irreducibility, known in static general equi-
librium theory to be necessary for the existence of Walras equilibra, is elucidated in the Appendix.
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Assumption (I) E is dynamically weakly irreducible, that is, for every
x ∈ τ∗, the short-term economy TxE is weakly irreducible.
Needless to say, as soon as initial endowments are interior and long-run preferences verify
the standard boundary condition, dynamics weak irreducibility is met. But the latter is of
course much weaker than the former.
Lemma 4.3.1.— (1) Under (C)(i)-(ii) and (I), and for fixed x ∈ τ∗, the three
following statements are equivalent:
(a) x ∈ Θ∗ ;
(b) 0 ∈ Fϕ(TxE) ;
(c) gh(xh) · x˙h = 0, all h, x˙ ∈ Fϕ(TxE) and p ∈ Π(TxE).
(2) If, in addition, (C)(iii) holds, one can replace Θ∗ with θ∗ in a).
Proof. (1) a)⇒ b). Under (I), the quasi-outcome correspondence X is upper semi-continuous
over the Euclidean space of linear economies L (Mertens (2003, Lemma III.6(b))), when the
space of allocations is equipped with the σ(L1, L∞) weak topology. However, since all tangent
economies are finite-dimensional, the space of equivalence classes where X takes its values
reduces to the Euclidean space
(
RC+
)N , and the weak topology reduces to the Euclidean
one. On the other hand, according to the definition of Filippov’s solution, every vector in
Fϕ
(
TxE
)
is either a short-term outcome of TxE or a limit of short-term outcomes, hence of
quasi-outcomes, of sequences of tangent economies TxnE , with xn → x. Consequently, every
vector in Fϕ
(
TxE
)
is a quasi-outcome of TxE .
According to Mertens (2003, Prop. III 14), since the measure space of players is non-
atomic, the short-term utility level induced by every Pareto-optimal allocation (wrt strict
allocations) of TxE is unique (a.e. sense, on the space of traders). Therefore, if x ∈ Θ, then
no-trade is Pareto-optimal in strict allocations in TxE . Hence, every Pareto-optimal point
in TxE , when computed with strict allocations, must induce a zero final utility level. Since
every quasi-outcome is Pareto-optimal wrt strict allocations, x ∈ Θ implies
0 ∈ Fϕ(TxE). (7)
But the quasi-outcomes of TxE and Tx E coincide. Hence, (7) implies b).
b) ⇒ (c) follows from (i) and the fact that, for each h, gh(xh) · 0 ≥ gh(xh) · x˙h.
(c) ⇒ (a). If the zero utility level is Pareto-optimal in strict allocations in TxE , this
exactly means that x ∈ Θ.
(2) follows from Lemma 3.1.1. However, we give here a direct proof of c)⇒ a). One needs
to check that (c) implies the first order conditions of Lemma 3.1.2. Let (x˙, p) be a short-term
outcome of TxE . From the duality theorem, one gets, for every h:
0 = gh(xh) · x˙h
= −gh(xh) · xh + p · xh max
{gkh(xh)
pk
| k ∈ {1, ..., C}}.
Consequently,
pk ≥
[ p · xh
gh(xh) · xh
]
gkh(xh)
for every h and k such that gh(xh)·xh > 0. But, as preferences are strictly monotone whenever
xh lies on the boundary ∂Xh, this latter condition is verified. It remains to check that the
above inequalities are in fact equalities for each commodity k such that xki > 0. Suppose the
contrary for some pair (h, k), multiply each inequality by xkh, and sum over h in order to get
a contradiction.
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The feasible set τ being compact, so is its image (written with a small abuse of notation)
U = (u1, ..., uN )(τ) ⊂ RN . A Pareto level u∗ = (u∗1, ..., u∗N ) ∈ U is a point belonging to
the upper boundary of U , i.e., such that u >> u∗ ⇒ u /∈ U . We denote by U∗ ⊂ U the
image u(Θ∗). Clearly, U∗ contains the Pareto and individually rational levels. The following
property (given here for the sake of completeness14) simplifies the study of convergence in
the utility space.
Lemma 4.3.2.— Under (C), for each h, there exists a real number ah such that,
after composition with a suitable smoothly strictly concave strictly increasing func-
tion ch, the image of τ∗ by the utility ch ◦ uh is included in (−∞, ah).
Proof. Since uh(ωh) > uh(0), we can consider a connected open set Xh containing Xˆh and
bounded away from {0}. The image uh
(X ) is an interval (α, β) ⊂ R. Indeed, if β > +∞, it
does not belong to the image of uh. Assume, on the contrary, that there exists some xh with
uh(xh) = β. Then, uh(xh + ε1) > vh(xh) = β for any ε > 0 and with 1 = (1, ..., 1) ∈ RC++.
A contradiction. Therefore, if β is finite, we take ah := β. Similarly, α, must be finite finite
because α > uh(0), and does not belong to the image of uh. Suppose, indeed, that uh(yh) = α
with yh ∈ Xh. Then, for ε > 0 sufficiently small, uh(yh − ε1) < uh(yh) with yh − ε1 ∈ Xh. A
contradiction.
If β = +∞, pick some ah > 0 and consider the function ch : (α,+∞)→ (−∞, ah) defined
by:
ch(t) =
ah(t− 2|α|)
t− α .
If β is finite, take αh = β. If ah > 0, take
ch =
2ah(t− (α+ β2 ))
t− α .
If ah < 0, take
ch =
ah(β − α)
t− α .
If ah = 0, then the function t 7→ t−βt−α does the job.
¤
A feasible allocation x is a limit-point of a curve ϕ : [a, b)→ τ if there exists a sequence
(tn) tending to +∞ such that ϕ(tn) → x. Let Ω(ϕ) denote the subset of limit-points of a
curve ϕ.
Theorem 4.3.1.— Under (C)(i)-(ii) and (I),
a) every limit-price trade curve ϕ is such that Ω(ϕ) 6= ∅ and Ω(ϕ) ⊂ Θ∗. More-
over, Ω(ϕ) is connected and closed. Conversely, every point in Θ is a locally stable
rest-point of the limit-price dynamics.
b) The traders’ utilities converge along every limit-price trade curve towards U∗.
c) If, in addition, (C)-(iii) holds and one utility uh is strictly quasi-concave on
the projection of Θ∗ over Xh, then every trade curve converges towards some
individually rational Pareto optimum in θ.
14This property belongs to the “folklore” of the profession, some manuscripts by Balasko have circulated
with a formal proof.
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Proof. a) Consider the function V : τ∗ → R by:
V(x) =
∑
i
uh(xh).
For every trade curve, one has for a.e. t > 0:
d
dt
V(x(t)) =
∑
h
∇uh(xh(t)) · x˙h.
Consequently, from Lemma 4.2.1, V(x) = 0 ⇐⇒ x ∈ Θ∗, otherwise, V(x) < 0. From
Champsaur, Dre`ze & Henry (1977), one deduces that every limit-point x∗ of a solution of
our dynamics belongs to Θ∗. That every solution admits at least one limit-point follows from
the compactness of τ∗.
Connectedness and closedness of Ω(ϕ) are then general properties of bounded Filippov
curves (cf. Filippov (1988, pp. 129-130)).
Conversely, every point x in Θ is such that 0 ∈ Fϕ
(
TxE
)
, hence is a rest point of the
dynamics. Finally, take x ∈ Θ, and some neighborhood V of x in τ . Since V is continuous,
let v > 0 be the maximum of V over the frontier V \V◦ . Consider, now, the subset U := {y ∈
τ | V(y) = 2v} ∩ V . Clearly, U is included in V , contains x, and if a solution starts in U , it
cannot escape from U . Hence, x is locally stable.
b) Let us transform each utility function uh into some auxiliary function uˆh in a way
that preserves the underlying preference order ºh⊂ Xh ×Xh of each player h, as well as the
monotonicity, continuity and convexity of this order. For further use, we also do it in a way
that guarantees that, whenever uh verifies assumption (D) (resp. is finitely subanalytic), so
does uˆh.
Next, according to Lemma 4.2.2, up to a smooth, strictly concave and ordinal transforma-
tion of utilities, each uˆh can be assumed, with no loss of generality, to take values in (−∞, ah).
But since τ∗ is compact, uˆh(Xˆh) is some compact subset of (−∞, ah), say [uˆh(ωh), bh]. Each
uˆh being increasing along every trade curve, it must converge. Since limit-points of a trade
curve belong to Θ∗, (uh)h converges towards U∗.
d) now follows from Lemma 3.1.1.
¤
Remark 4.3.1. The last theorem says that, as a whole, Θ is globally asymptotically
stable. However, due to the fact that Pareto allocations are not isolated, no x ∈ Θ can be
locally asymptotically stable.15 As already remarked by de Michelis (2000), however, such a
lack of local asymptotic stability, though highly non-generic in the landscape of dynamical
systems, is probably specific to economic systems as opposed to, say, Anosov or Morse-Smale
flows arising from physics. On the other hand, the limit-price dynamics cannot be structurally
stable in the sense of Smale : Indeed, in the 2 × 2 case (where, as we shall see, the LPP
vector field turns out to be smooth), it would follow from Peixoto (1959) that structural
stability implies that all rest points are hyperbolic and isolated. Again, this last drawback
is not peculiar to the limit-price dynamics dynamics, but is inherent to the non-taˆtonnement
approach as such.
Let us denote by θˆ∗h := {xh ∈ Xˆh : ∃x−h ∈ L1
(
[0, 1] \ [ hN ; h+1N )
) | (xh, x−h) ∈ τ∗ ∩ θ}
the subset of bundles of player h that are feasible, individually rational and compatible with
some Pareto-optimal allocation.
Next, let us recall Smale’s (1976b) E(xchange) axiom (rephrased in our set-up):
(a) ∀t, (x(t)) is type-symmetric ;
(b) p(t) · x˙h(t) = p(t) · xh(t), each t ∈ [a, b) and h = 1, ..., N .
(c) ∀h, and every t ≥ 0, if x˙h(t) 6= 0, then x˙h(t) · gh(xh(t)) > 0.
15A rest point x is locally asymptotically stable if, whenever the dynamical system starts not too far away
from x, it converges to x.
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(d) If there exists a feasible allocation z that is a non-trivial solution of the
following system of equations:∑
h zh = 0
p(t) · zh = 0 h = 1, ..., N.
zh · gh(xh(t)) > 0, if zh 6= 0 h = 1, ..., N
then x˙h(t) 6= 0 for some h.
Definition 4.3.1. (Smale (1976))
A trajectory (x(·), p(·)) is complete if (x(t), p(t)) converges to (x0, p0) and no non-trivial
trajectory satisfying Axiom E can start from (x0, p0).
The following is an immediate consequence of Theorem 4.2.1.
Corollary 4.3.1.— Under (C)(i)-(ii) and (I), every limit-price trade curve is
complete, and verifies Smale’s E axiom in strict allocations. If, in addition, (iii)
holds, “strict” can be dropped from the preceding sentence.
Example 4.3.2.??????????? One may wonder whether there exist economies with some
Walras equilibrium that Pareto-dominates the rest point(s) of its strategy-proof trajectorie(s).
Suppose, indeed, that u1(x, y) = x, u2(x, y) = 0, ω1 = (0, 2) and ω2 = (3, 1). Every feasible
allocation x such that (x1, y1) ∈ [0, 3]×{0} is a Walras equilibrium, while the unique Pareto-
optimal Walras equilibrium is x∗ =
(
(3, 0), (0, 3)
)
. On the other hand, the unique trade
curve where all the players tell the truth (i.e., truthfully mimic their short-term supply
correspondences by sending the appropriate limit-price orders) remains stuck at the initial
point ω. The reason for this is that, in our game-theoretic interpretation of the linear economy
TωE(= E), trader 2 refuses to trade. Although the unique rest-point of our dynamics turns out
to be Pareto-dominated by most Walras equilibria in this economy, we feel that it provides a
more convincing and sensible solution than the Walrasian one : what is, indeed, the economic
rationale for agent 2 (whose utility is independent of trades) to take active part to the market
? Notice, by the way, that the constant curve {ω} is not the unique strategy-proof trade curve
of E , since misrepresenting her short-term preferences is harmless for player 2 ((C)(ii) is not
fulfilled).
4.4 Uniqueness, smoothness and stability
The next theorem is the more surprising result of this paper. It shows that, generically, for
almost every starting point, limit-price trajectories are unique up to a certain time, depend
smoothly upon initial conditions, and that the convergence towards a rest-point is piecewise
exponential. For this purpose, we need some preliminary material. The next assumption is
standard. Notice, however, that it involves no boundary condition.
Assumption (D).
For every h, the restriction of uh to Xˆh is C2, strictly differentiably monotonic
(i.e., ∇uh|Xˆh >> 0), and strictly differentiably concave (i.e., the restriction of its
Hessian Huh over the supporting hyperplane ∇u⊥h is positive definite). Moreover,
ωh > 0.
Lemma 4.4.1.— Under (D), and if E is finite-dimensional, for every stratum S,
T ∩ S is negligible in S.
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Proof. According to Lemma 3.1.1 and Theorem 3.2.1, it suffices to show that, for every
stratum S, the subset θ∗ ∪ S is of dimension strictly less than dimS. If S has an empty
intersection with τ∗, this is trivial. Suppose therefore that S ∩ τ∗ 6= ∅. Since uh(ωh) > uh(0)
(because preferences are strictly monotone and ωh > 0 for each h), for every h, a point in
θ∗, being individually rational, must be such that every household h helds a positive amount
of at least one commodity. Hence, the dimension of S is at least equal to the number N of
agents.
We now say that S is not an isolated community stratum iff there is no non-trivial
partition of NN such that agents that are partitioned into different classes have no common
commodity at x ∈ S. In other words, S is an isolated community stratum provided there
exists a non-trivial partition of NC into C1 and C2, and a partition of NC into B1 and B2,
such that if x ∈ S and either (h ∈ C1 and c ∈ B2) or (h ∈ A2 and c ∈ B1), then xch = 0.16
More generally, the communities of S are defined as follows. Let ∼ be an equivalence relation
on NN defined by h ∼ i iff there is a sequence of positive integers h = i1, i2, ..., is = i, each
ik ≤ N , and a corresponding sequence of positive integers c1, ..., cs−1, each ck ≤ C, such that,
for k = 1, ..., s − 1, we have xckik and x
ck
ik+1
both positive from some (hence all) x ∈ S. The
communities of S are the equivalence classes of NN under ∼.
Then, Proposition 2.9 in Schecter (1977) says the following under (D): Let S be a stratum
of τ with n communities (1 ≤ n ≤ N).17 The subset θ ∩ S is contained in a submanifold
with corners of dimension less than N − n < N ≤ dimS. Consequently, T ⊂ θ∗ verifies the
condition stated in the Lemma.
¤
A long-run economy E is said to be finitely-subanalytic if the mapping ω : [0, 1]→ RC is
so,18 and if each utility uh is so (h = 1, ..., N). We shall prove below that finitely-subanalytic
economies are dense within the family of long-run economies verifying (D). Our next result
says that, if E is finitely-subanalytic, then the vector field associated to our dynamics is
smooth on an open and dense subset of the feasible set. Thanks to the Cauchy-Lipschitz
theory of smooth differential equations, this implies that, when restricted to this generic
subset, the Cauchy problem induced by our dynamics admits a (globally) unique solution
path.19
Notice that Bonnisseau et alii (2001) proved that, generically in the space of finite-
dimensional linear economies, the Walras correspondence reduces to a smooth map.20 If
x ∈ τ is such that TxE belongs to this generic subclass of linear economies, then the re-
striction of our vector field to a sufficiently small neighborhood of {x} is smooth. Indeed, it
follows from Proposition 6.2.1 in Appendix 6.2 that, under (D), the unique Walras equilib-
rium associated to TxE must coincide with the short-term outcome. If x does not belong to
the “right” subclass, then using the local controllability of utility gradients (see, e.g., Lemma
12.8 in Magill & Quinzii (1998)) one can presumably locally perturb E in such a way that
TyE becomes “nice” (admits a unique Walras equilibrium that varies smoothly with respect
to underlying parameters). However, being local in essence, this kind of argument does not
enable to have a global picture of the smoothness of our dynamics. This is why the argument
given in the next Theorem is completely different from the one just sketched.
We denote by V : τ × RC → Tτ × SC+ the cone field associating to each state x the set
of infinitesimal trades, and (normalized) prices (x˙, p) induced by our dynamics. Remember
that its restriction to τ \ θ is a vector field.
Theorem 4.4.1.— For any finitely subanalytic economy E verifying (D), the
feasible set τ can be partitioned as:
16See Smale (1974a) and Schecter (1977).
17If n = 1, S is not an isolated community stratum.
18See the Appendix for a definition.
19Of course, here, uniqueness obtains after relative prices have been normalized. In Giraud & Tsomocos
(2004), money is introduced, and uniqueness obtains both in real and nominal terms.
20An analogous result is also obtained by Florenzano & ?? for infinite-dimensional economies.
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τ = R∪ C
where both R and C are finitely subanalytic subsets, the latter being closed, of
dimension strictly less than CN − C =dimR, and containing θ. Moreover, the
restriction of V to the (open and dense) subset R is a real-analytic, hence smooth,
vector field. Finally, the restriction of the Lyapounov function introduced in the
proof of Theorem 4.2.1 can be chosen to satisfy for every trade curve x(·): ∀ω =
x(0) ∈ τ and ∀t ≥ 0 | x(t) ∈ R,
V(x(t)) = e−tV(x(0)).
Proof. Since we can eliminate subsets of measure zero (i.e., in N ) from the configuration
space without modifying the Filippov dynamics, on each stratum S of τ , we can safely replace
the set of short-run prices associated to points in T ⊂ θ∗ with an arbitrary measurable
selection of the short-run price correspondence. This is possible since the correspondence
of short-run prices is semi-algebraic, hence Borel measurable, hence admits a measurable
selection, while T is negligible in the stratum in which it lives, thanks to Lemma 3.4.1. Let
us therefore replace our LPP dynamics by the one induced by any vector field obtained after
this modification on T . We obtain a full-blown (discontinuous) vector field (and not just a
cone field). Recall also that, if this vector field happens to be continuous (a fortiori smooth),
then Filippov solutions coincide with standard ones.
Since E is finitely subanalytic, so are TxE and TxE . Moreover, if f : A ⊂ Rn → Rm
is finitely subanalytic and differentiable, so is its differential. (It suffices to express the
differential as a limit of variation rates, and to apply Tarski-Seidenberg theorems.) Thus,
the map x 7→ TxE is itself finitely-subanalytic. But the set-valued map that associates to
each tangent economy its set of short-run outcomes is finitely-subanalytic as well. Thus,
along a trade curve φ, every tangent (hence, short-run) economy crossed by φ is finitely-
subanalytic. Consequently, so is the set-valued map V . As just recalled, its restriction to
τ \ θ is a point-valued map. Thus (cf. Coste (2000, Lemma 6.8, p. 71)), there exists an
open, finitely subanalytic subset R of τ \ θ such that V|R is real-analytic (hence C∞) and
dim(τ \ R) <dimτ = CN − C. Obviously, R is dense in τ . It suffices to define C := τ \ R.
Finally, since every short-run outcome x˙ in TxE belongs to τTxE , x˙ points along τ for every
x ∈ ∂τ (see the Appendix for a definition). Thus, the vector field associated to our dynamics
points along its configuration space. It then follows from Schecter (1977, Lemma 3.3.) that,
whenever the vector field is C1, smooth integral curves of this vector field exist for all future
time as long as the vector field remains smooth.
The result on the exponential convergence is now a consequence from the fact that,
according to Theorem 4.2.1., the set Θ is asymptotically stable, according to the present
Theorem, the restriction of every trade curve to R is smooth, and from Bhatia & Szego¨
(1970, V.2.12). ¤
The set C of critical economies being finitely subanalytic, it is the finite, disjoint union
of smooth submanifolds, all of them of dimension less than CN − C. The picture that can
be derived from the previous theorem is therefore the following: τ can be partitioned into
finitely many open, disjoint subsets, separated by smooth submanifolds Ck, such that the
union of these open subsets (=R) is dense in the feasible set, and the restriction of our vector
field to each open subset is smooth. Notice that, under (D), the boundary ∂τ need not be
entirely made of critical submanifolds. One can relax assumption (D) and replace it by (C)
in the last Theorem, but then the negligible subset of τ that needs to be modified in order
to get a well-defined vector field must contain the whole boundary ∂τ .
In order to have a closer look at what happens near a critical submanifold Ck, consider a
trade curve x(·) crossing a C1 hypersurface S at some point x at time, say, T . Let the interior
of the feasible set τ∗ be separated by S into domains G− and G+. The partial derivatives ∂ϕ∂xk ,
k = 1, ..., C(N − 1) are continuous in domains G+ and G− up to the boundary. Let ϕ−(x)
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and ϕ+(x) be the limiting values of the function f at the point x ∈ S, from the domains G−
and G+ respectively. Let
h(x) := ϕ+(x)− ϕ−(x),
be the discontinuity vector at x of our vector field. Finally, let ϕ−N , ϕ
+
N , hN be the (orthogonal)
projections of the vectors ϕ−, ϕ+, h onto the normal line to S directed from G− to G+ at
the point x. Within the domains G− and G+, right and left uniqueness of solution to (2)
holds true (Cauchy-Lipschitz theorem). All we therefore need is to study what happens in
a neighborhood of the hypersurface S. The following Proposition summarizes the various
situations we may encounter:
Proposition 4.4.1.— (Filippov21) If S is C2 and the function h(x) = f+(x) −
f−(x) is C1 at each point x ∈ S, if, moreover, at least one of the inequalities
f−N > 0 or f
+
N < 0 (possibly different inequalities for different x) holds, the right
uniqueness for (2) occurs for a < t < b in G.
A nice aspect of finitely subanalytic economies is that the set of economies for which our
dynamics can be exactly simulated is certainly included in this family.22
How large is the class of finitely subanalytic economies ? If the space of initial endowments
is taken to be the space of continuous maps ω : [0, 1] → τ , equipped with the uniform
convergence, then density of finitely subanalytic endowment maps follows from the Stone-
Weierstraß theorem. Regarding preferences, we take ω >> 0 as fixed, and equip the space of
preferences restricted to τ and verifying (D) with the C2 topology.23
Proposition 4.4.2. Given ω >> 0, the set of preferences representable by a
finitely subanalytic utility is dense in the space of C2 utilities satisfying (D).
Proof. This follows from the standard proof showing that smooth preferences are dense
in the space of C2 utilities (see, e.g., Mas-Colell (1985, Prop. 2.8.1. p. 90)) by keeping track
of the fact that every object involved in the construction of the approximating sequence of
smooth preferences must be finitely subanalytic. For this, one simply needs to observe that:
(i) for any integer n > 0, a C∞-density function ξn : R` → R with support containing the
origin and radius ≤ 1n can be constructed so as to be finitely subanalytic;
(ii) If v, ξn : R` → R are finitely subanalytic, so is the restriction of the convolution
u′n(x) :=
∫
R
v(x− z)ξn(z)dz
to the compact τ . (Notice that the support of z in the integral is bounded.)
¤
The next examples illustrate the fact that (global) uniqueness of the strategy-proof trade
curves obtains even though the set of Walras equilibria of the underlying economy may exhibit
a strong indeterminacy.
Example 4.3.1. This time, suppose that u1(x, y) = u2(x, y) = x + y, ω1 = (2, 1), ω2 =
(1, 3). E is linear, and admits a continuum of Walras equilibrium allocations, all of them
being Pareto-optimal. However, as we already saw, it admits a unique short-term price
P (L) = {(1, 1)}, and a unique short-term outcome: x∗1 = (97 , 127 ), x∗2 = (127 , 167 ). The unique
21See Filippov (1968), Lemma 2 and Corollary 1 (p. 107), Corollary 2 and Lemma 3 (p. 108) and Theorem
2 (p. 110).
22This is also the family of economies to which the use of finite elements will lead, in order, say, to ap-
proximate weak solutions of our trajectories in the sense of the Ritz method (see, e.g., Zeidler (1991, p.
141).
23That is, the topology of uniform convergence over the compact τ of each ui and its derivatives up to order
2.
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strategy-proof trade curve starting at ω will follow the affine line containing both ω (which
coincides with the point e in Fig. 3.4.1) and x∗, until x∗ is reached.
Remark 4.3.1. Curiously, no transversality argument seems at first glance to appear in
the proof of the generic global uniqueness and smoothness of trajectories in our argument.
Actually, transversality is “hidden” behind the property that every finitely subanalytic set is
locally trivial. This point plays the role, in algebraic geometry, of Sard’s theorem, and is at
the heart of the fact that a finitely subanalytic map is almost everywhere real-analytic.
Remark 4.3.2. The previous generic smoothness and uniqueness results do not tell us
what happens along a submanifold of “critical” endowments, for which our dynamics ceases
to be representable by a smooth vector field. According to Proposition 4.3.1, if the trajectory
solution to our dynamics is transversal to such a critical manifold, then uniqueness still
obtains (but smoothness may be lost: the trade curve may exhibit a kink when it crosses the
submanifold S). This is precisely what happens near θ according to Lemma 5.1. We leave
for further research the task of investigating whether a generic finitely subanalytic economy
can be chosen so that almost all its trade curves cross transversally the critical submanifolds
distinct from θ.
5 The 2×2 case
When C = 2, a pseudo-outcome at x(t) consists of a strictly positive price system (pa, pb), and
an allocation x such that almost all traders maximize their marginal utility subject to their
current budget constraint. A pseudo-outcome is then proportional if there are weights µab and
µba with µab+µba > 0, and every agent whose demand set includes both goods receives them
in proportions µab and µba. In other words, every limit order with a limit price corresponding
to (pa, pb) will be exchanged for quantities of both goods in the above proportions. There
will be no commodities with zero price, and the algorithm ends. By Theorem 3.2.1 there
will be a single proportional pseudo-outcome and, as long as this allocation involves trade,
there will also be a unique price vector (up to a scalar). Regarding the proportional rule, it
admits a simple reformulation in the two-good case: if there are several limit-orders at the
market-clearing price, the mechanism computes a proportion α ∈ [0, 1] such that markets
clear while each limit order at this price is paid in proportions (α, 1 − α) in commodities a
and b respectively. This is also equivalent to saying that all sell-orders of good a are executed
in proportion 1− α, and all sell-orders of good b in proportion α.
A trade-path x(·) is non-degenerate if it is not constant.
Lemma 5.1.— Suppose E is finitely subanalytic, verifies (D) and the boundary
condition u−1h (uh(xh)) ∩ ∂Xh = ∅ for every x ∈ τ . Then, for each x ∈ θ∗, there
exists a neighborhood W of x in τ such that every non-degenerate trade path
starting in W , is smooth, globally unique, and converges to some y ∈ θ.
Proof. Under the conditions of the Lemma, θ is a smooth submanifold of τ of dimension
N −1. Proposition 4 in Smale (1976) asserts, in addition, that the tangent hyperplane Ky to
the indifference surfaces at y ∈ θ is transversal to θ. If a non-degenerate trade path converges
to y ∈ θ, then, according to Proposition 4.3.1, for each point x ∈ θ, one has ϕ−N (x) > 0 and
ϕ+N (x) < 0. It follows that, onto this point x, there comes exactly one solution of (2) from G
−
and one solution from G+.24 Indeed, as t increases, the solutions can escape from the curve
θ neither into the domain G− nor into G+. They therefore must remain on θ and satisfy the
equation
x˙ = ϕ0(x),
where the function ϕ0 is defined according to the following formula:
24See also Filippov op. cit. Corollary 2, p. 108.
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ϕ0(x) := α(x)ϕ+(x) + (1− α(x))ϕ−(x), α(x) := ϕ
−
N (x)
ϕ−N (x)− ϕ+N (x)
. (8)
Since θ is C1, the unit vector n(x) of the normal to θ is a C1-function of the point x, so
that α, f−N and f
+
N , hence also ϕ
0, are C1 functions of the local coordinates of x on the curve
θ. Then, through each point of θ, there passes exactly one solution of the equation x˙ = ϕ0(x).
It next follows that ϕ−N (x) = −λ(x)f+N , where λ(x) > 0. As a consequence, ϕ0 is constantly
equal to 0. Thus, each solution of (2) converges to θ and remains stuck to x once a point
x ∈ θ has been reached.
¤
The next Proposition shows that the generic regularity property proven in Theorem 4.3.1
above holds for every 2× 2 economy starting at an interior point. Equivalently, Proposition
5.1. shows that, in the 2×2 interior case, the unique critical submanifold is θ.
Proposition 5.1.
Every 2× 2 exchange economy E verifying the assumptions of Lemma 5.1 is such
that every strategy-proof trade curve x(·) is real-analytic, and its rest-point x∗ is a
smooth function of ω. Finally, p(t)→ p∗, where p∗ is the unique sustaining price
of x∗.
Proof. For every linear economy L = (b, e), define the subsets
G(b, e) :=
{
(i, `) ∈ I × L | ` ∈ δ(bpi , (b, e))},
G+(b, e) :=
{
(i, `) ∈ I × L | ∃x ∈W (b, e), xi` > 0
}
.
Clearly, G+(b, ω) ⊂ G(b, ω). Now, it follows from Bonnisseau et al. (2001) that, if
G+(b, ω) has no (nondegenerate) cycle, then the map ϕ is C∞ on a neighborhood of the linear
economy (b, e) in
(
RCN+
)2. Let us call regular a linear economy verifying this condition. It
is not difficult to see that, in the 2×2 case, a short-run economy is always regular unless its
base point x ∈ θE . Thus, Cauchy-Lipschitz implies that we only need to check what happens
near θ. But this has already been investigated in Lemma 5.1. Nevertheless, we provide here
a more pedestrian proof of the transversality argument of Lemma 5.1, adapted to the 2× 2
case. A point x ∈ θ is characterized by the fact that the two indifference curves Ii, i = 1, 2
passing through x are tangent. The normal vector to I1 (resp. I2) at x is given by ∇u1(x)
(resp. −∇u2(ω − x)), where ω =
∑2
i=1 ωi is the aggregate endowment of the economy E .
Since those two vectors must be collinear, θ can be defined by the equation:
∂u1
∂x1
(x)
∂u2
∂x2
(ω − x) = ∂u1
∂x2
(x)
∂u2
∂x1
(ω − x), (9)
for x ∈ G. The normal unit vector n(x) to θ at x is therefore given by ∇j(x)/||∇j(x)||, where:
j(x) :=
∂u1
∂x1
(x)
∂u2
∂x2
(ω − x)− ∂u1
∂x2
(x)
∂u2
∂x1
(ω − x).
On the other hand, since x ∈ θ, there exists a (unique) price vector p = (p1, p2) such that
∇u1(x) = γp and ∇u2(x) = δp, for some γ, δ > 0. A simple calculation yields:
∇j(x) = K(x)q, (10)
where the 2× 2 real matrix K(x) is given by:25
K(x) := γHu1(x) + δHu2(ω − x)
and
25Where we denote by Hu the Hessian matrix of the function u.
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q := (p2,−p1).
Finally, it follows that the quadratic form associated with the symmetric matrix K is definite
negative. Indeed, due to the strict quasi-concavity of preferences,
z′Kz = γz′Hu1(x)z + δz′Hu2(ω − x)z
is strictly negative as soon as z 6= 0. Suppose, now, by way of contradiction, that ∇j(x) and
p are collinear. This would imply that:
∂j
∂x1
(x1, x2)p2 − ∂j
∂x2
(x1, x2)p1 = 0.
Equivalently:
q · ∇j(x) = 0
from which (10) yields
q ·K(x)q = 0,
which would contradict the positive definiteness of K(x). From this, the result follows.
Finally, for every t, p(t) coincides with the unique (up to a normalization) Walrasian price
vector of Tx(t)E . From Lemma 4.2.1, we deduce that (0, ..., 0, gi(x∗i )) is a Walras equilibrium
of Tx∗E (and gi(x∗i ) is actually independent of i). By the upper semi-continuity of the Walras
equilibrium correspondence, p(t) converges to gi(x∗i ).
¤
When the initial endowment ωic of commodity c increases, one would like that some
substitution effect induces the demand for other commodities to decrease, hence that the
‘equilibrium price’ of alternative commodities increases. This is not true, in general, in
static GET (except under the Gross Substitutability restriction). Let ∂ωpk(b, ω) denote the
generalized gradient of pk(b, ·) at (b, ω), and choose some commodity ` as nume´raire.
Proposition 5.2.— (Bonnisseau et al. (2001)) For every i and every k 6= `, for
all (b, ω) ∈ R2CN++ ,
pii` ≥ 0 for all pi ∈ ∂ωpk(b, ω).
Thus, for every interior starting point, under the conditions of Proposition 5.1, every
trade curve of LPP verifies the Gross Substitutability property in the short-run.
We end this section with a last remark. Is it possible that the receipt of a gift can make
the recipient worst off (and the donor best off) ? As is well-known, the disappointing answer
of static GET is positive26, and can be illustrated by the following Edgeworth box:
26See Samuelson (1952) for the link with (taˆtonnement) stability. Chichilnisky (1980) proves that, with 3
agents, the paradox occurs even at a taˆtonnement-stable” (Walras) equilibrium (see also Geanakoplos & Heal
(1983)).
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r ω
θ
r x∗
r ω′
r
Fig. 5.1. The static transfer paradox
In the LPP, this phenomenon never occurs in the 2×2 case, as follows from the uniqueness
of strategy-proof trade curves (Proposition 5.1):
rω
θ
r x∗
rω′
r
Fig. 5.2. No dynamic transfer paradox
5.1 Full characterization of trade curves
If initial endowments ω are Pareto-efficient, preferences are non-linear at ω, and the assump-
tions of Proposition 5.1 are in force, then the unique strategy-proof trade curve starting at ω
coincides with no-trade. From now one, we therefore suppose in this subsection that ω /∈ θ.
Define the first diagonal of the Edgeworth box as the affine line ∆ passing through ω
and containing the two points
(
(ω1, 0), (0, ω2)
)
and
(
(0, ω2), (ω1, 0)
)
. The vector pi1 = (ω2ω1 , 1)
(resp. pi2 = (ω1ω2 , 1)) is a vector normal to ∆ viewed in the orthonormal basis of player 1 (resp.
player 2). One easily checks on the Edgeworth box that, as long as
bx1 > pi
x
1 and b
y
2 > pi
y
2 , (11)
then the unique resulting pseudo-outcome of the marginal economy (which coincides with
the unique outcome and also with the unique Walras equilibrium) will be
(
(ω1, 0), (0, ω2)
)
.
Similarly, whenever
by1 > pi
y
1 and b
x
2 > pi
x
2 , (12)
the unique short-term outcome will be
(
(0, ω2), (ω1, 0)
)
. As a consequence, whenever either
(11) or (12) is safisfied on each corresponding marginal economy, the unique strategy-proof
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trade curve will follow ∆, and eventually converge in finite time to the unique Walras equi-
librium of E lying on ∆. Whence:
• Case 1 The trade curve follows the straight line ∆.
r ω
θ
r x∗
Fig. 5.1.1.
In this first case, the main virtue of our dynamical “non-taˆtonnement” is to select one
Walras equilibrium of E among the possibly numerous ones that were all equally conceivable
from a static viewpoint. The one selected is, in some sense, the most “natural” one, and
corresponds to the simplest conceivable trade curve — a straight line. As for prices, they
constantly remain equal to pi1 along the trade curve.
Now, it may happen that, along the trajectory, at some point x(t) ∈ τ both (11) and (12)
are violated. Suppose that:
bx1 ≥ pix1 and by2 ≤ piy2 . (13)
In this case, the unique resulting outcome of the marginal economy will be at the intersection
of the (linear) indifference curve of player 2 containing x2(t) with the axis x11 = 0. This means
that, starting from x(t), the strategy-proof trade curve will follow the indifference curve of
player 2 in E until it reaches the set θ. Similarly, if
by1 ≤ piy1 and bx2 ≥ pix2 , (14)
then the unique short-term outcome will be at the intersection of player 1’s indifference curve
with the axis y22 = 0. As a consequence, the trajectory will follow the indifference curve of
player 1 in E until some Pareto-efficient point is reached. Both scenarii correspond to:
• Case 2.
The trade curve starts by following a straight line, and then follows the indifference curve
of one of the two traders.
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rω
θ
r x∗
Fig. 5.1.2
In this case, the unique strategy-proof trade curve never converges to a Walras equilibrium
of E , and the price system is constant along the first part of the trade curve (as long as it
follows a straight line), and subsequently smoothly changes across time.
• Case 3.
Eventually, it may be the case that either (13) or (14) is already fulfilled at ω, in which
case the unique strategy-proof trade curve follows one player’s indifference curve from the
beginning.
rω
θ
r x∗
Fig 5.1.3.
In this case, prices are never piecewise constant across time, and the trade curve never
converges to any Walras equilibrium of E . Obviously, the player whose indifference curve is
followed will take no advantage from trade, and in particular will necessarily be disadvantaged
in comparison with the final allocation that would have been predicted by static GET. This
is clearly the consequence of her myopic behavior.
The Edgeworth box is viewed as a rectangle in R×R whose left-top (resp. right-bottom)
corner has coordinates (0, y) (resp. (x, 0)). Between time t and t + 1, the state xt makes a
“jump” of length ∆ := |xt+1−xt|, unless xt was already a rest-point. Initial endowments are
ω = (x1(0), y1(0)). The price vector is denoted by p = (px, py), and normalized by putting
py = 1. The coordinates of agent i’s commodity bundle at time t ∈ N are (xi(t), yi(t)). Of
course, (x2(t), y2(t)) = (x− x1(t), y − y1(t)) ∀t.
The algorithm works as follows.
26
If, at time t, the state is (x1(t), y1(t)) with 0 < x1(t) < x et 0 < y1(t) < y (i.e., the current
allocation belongs to τ
◦
), first compute the gradients of each player’s utility:
∇ui(xi(t), yi(t)) = (∂ui∂xi (xi(t), yi(t)),
∂ui
∂yi
(xi(t), yi(t))).
Denote by ai(t) = |
∂ui
∂xi
∂ui
∂yi
(xi(t), yi(t))| the absolute value of i’s marginal rate of substitution
between commodity x and y. In the marginal economy TE(x1(t), y1(t)), agent 1’s linear ‘utility’
is given by:
vi(dxi, dyi) := ∇ui(xi(t), yi(t)) · (dxi, dyi).
• Case 1 : a1 = a2. This means that the current point xt is a Pareto-optimum. Then
xi(t+ 1) = xi(t) et yi(t+ 1) = yi(t) ∀i = 1, 2,
then, put p(t) = p(T − 1).
• Case 2 : a1 6= a2. Two subcases have to be distinguished:
A. If a1 > a2. Consider the line passing through (x1(t), y1(t)) and (x, 0), whose slope
is m = y1(t)x1(t)−x < 0.
(A.i) a2 ≤ |m| ≤ a1. In this case, the vector field points towards (x, 0). In other
terms
xi(t+ 1) = xi(t) + ∆ and yi(t+ 1) = yi(t)− |m|∆,
and p(t+ 1) = (|m|, 1).
(A.ii) |m| ≤ a2 < a1. Then,
xi(t+ 1) = xi(t) + ∆ and yi(t+ 1) = yi(t)− |a2|∆,
with p(t+ 1) = (|a2|, 1).
(A.iii) a2 < a1 ≤ |m|. Then,
xi(t+ 1) = xi(t) + ∆ and yi(t+ 1) = yi(t)− |a1|∆,
with p(t+ 1) = (|a1|, 1).
B. If a1 < a2, consider the line ∆ passing through (x1(t), y1(t)) and (0, y), with slope
m = y1(t)−yx1(t) < 0.
(B.i) a1 ≤ |m| ≤ a2. This time, the vector field points towards (0, y):
xi(t+ 1) = xi(t)−∆ and yi(t+ 1) = yi(t) + |m|∆,
with p(t+ 1) = (|m|, 1).
(B.ii) |m| ≤ a1 < a2. Then,
xi(t+ 1) = xi(t)−∆ and yi(t+ 1) = yi(t) + |a1|∆,
with p(t+ 1) = (|a1|, 1).
(B.iii) a1 < a2 ≤ |m|. Then,
xi(t+ 1) = xi(t)−∆ and yi(t+ 1) = yi(t) + |a2|∆,
p(t+ 1) = (|a2|, 1).
Start the algorithm again at time t+ 1.
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Here are some numerical examples:
Example 5.1.1 E is already linear, with u1(x1, y1) = (2, 1), u2(x2, y2) = (1, 2), (x1(0), y1(0)) =
(1, 2), and (x, y) = (3, 3). The trade curve converges to the unique competitive equilibrium(
(3, 0), (0, 3)
)
along the diagonal of the Edgeworth box. Prices are constant across time
p(t) = (1, 1) for all t.
Example 5.1.2 u1(x1, y1) = x1−18(y1)−8 and u2(x2, y2) = −18(x2)−8+y2. (x1(0), y1(0)) =
(2, r) and (x2(0), y2(0)) = (r, 2) with r = 2
8
9 − 2 19 > 0. The state of the economy converges
to the unique symmetric competitive equilibrium (0, y) along the diagonal, with p(t) = (1, 1)
for all t. Notice that this economy admits two other Walras equilibria, none of them being
symmetric.
Example 5.1.3 u1(x1, y1) =
√
x1y1 and u2(x2, y2) = 103x1+ 110y2. (x1(0), y1(0)) = (4, 1)
et (x2(0), y2(0)) = (1, 4). This time, the state follows first a straight line, then around the
center of the Edgeworth box, say at time T , it starts following a curve, and ends up at
the Pareto optimal final allocation (x∗1, y∗1) = (1.25, 5), see the next figure. The price of
commodity y is constantly equal to 1 until T , and then starts increasing until 4. The end-
point is much more favorable to player 2 than the unique static Walras equilibrium of the
economy.
s
e
sx∗
τ∗
Fig. 5.1.4. Example 5.1.3
sx(T )
Example 5.1.427 u1(x1, y1) = x1− 1y1 and u2(x2, y2) = − 1x2 +y2.28 (x1(0), y1(0)) = (3, 0)
and (x2(0), y2(0)) = (0, 3). Every point on the intersection of the hyperbola (3 − x)2y = 1
with the Edgeworth box is a Walras equilibrium. Hence, this economy admits a continuum
of static Walras equilibria, but a unique trade curve, which converges towards the Walras
equilibrium x∗1 = (2, 1) (which is also the closest point of the hyperbola just mentioned to
initial endowments). Prices are constantly equal to (1, 1) throughout.
27I owe this example to Heracles Polemarchakis.
28With the convention 1
0
:= 0.
28
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Fig. 5.1.5 Example 5.1.4
6 Concluding remarks
In this section, we first provide the game-theoretic interpretation of the limit-price dynamics
that justifies its name, and then conclude with some additional remarks.
6.1 A game-theoretic interpretation
Fix a marginal economy TxE . The short-term outcome associated with TxE can actually be
understood as the unique outcome induced by a dominant strategy profile of some underlying
strategic market game29 G[TxE ] induced by Mertens’ (2003) limit-price mechanism. The rules
of this game mimic those of actual financial markets: players (i.e., of traders of TxE) send
limit- and market-price orders to some central clearing house, which computes the resuylting
outcome according to some rationing rule. According to Mertens (2003), indeed, a limit-
order to sell good ` in exchange for commodity c gives a quantity 0 ≤ q` ≤ x`h to be sold,
and a relative price p
+
`
p+c
. The order is to sell up to q` units of commodity ` in exchange for
good c if the relative price p`pc is greater than, or equal to,
p+`
p+c
. Similarly, a market order to
sell good ` in exchange for commodity c gives quantity 0 ≤ q` units of good ` to be sold at
any positive value of the relative price p`pc .
Therefore, a limit-order to “sell” ` against c at relative prices p+c = 0, p
+
` > 0 is, in fact,
an order not to buy c. (By means of comparison, in a standard Shapley & Shubik (1977)
game, only market orders are allowed, and only against the nume´raire, while in a Shapley
windows model (1976), market orders can be sent for any pair of commodities.)
Following Mertens (2003), one can impose, with no loss of generality, that only sell-orders
be allowed. (If a player wants to buy a commodity, she just has to sell some nume´raire !)
Observe, now, that, given some collection of orders, one can define a fictitious linear economy
as follows:
¤ I is, now, the set of orders;
¤ For each fictitious “agent” i (i.e., for each order), its linear “utility” is given by
bi := (p+1 , ..., p
+
C) ;
¤ Its “initial endowment” is defined as ei := (q1, ..., qC).
29See Giraud (2003) for an introduction to strategtic market games.
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In other words, a collection of orders (or, equivalently, a strategy profile, or still equiv-
alently, an order book) can be formalized as a linear economy. Here are some examples:
(i) Consider a 2-good economy, with commodity 2 playing the role of a nume´raire, whose
price is normalized to 1. A market sell-order of qi1 units of commodity 1 corresponds to the
linear “utility function” bi = (0, 1) and an “initial endowment” ei = (qi1, 0): the trader i who
has sent this order is ready to sell the amount qi1 against any quantity of commodity 2 at any
price.
(ii) A limit selling order i with limit price p corresponds to a “utility” vector bi = (p, 1):
the amount ei1 put up for sale will stay untouched at any price less than p, and is intended
to be fully sold at any price at least equal to p.
(iii) The order ei = (1, 0) together with the “utility” bi = (1, 0) is equivalent to the
strategy consisting in keeping 1 unit of commodity 1. Hence, strategies consisting in refusing
to trade can be mimicked by means of limit-price orders.
(iv) If C > 2, and ei = (0, ..., 1, ...0) (1 stands in the cth position),
bi = (p+1 , 0, ..., 0, p
+
c , 0, ..., 0)
is a limit sell order of one unit of good c in exchange for commodity 1 with limit price p
+
c
p+1
.
(v) With ei as in (iv), bi = (p+1 , p
+
2 , 0, ..., 0), where c /∈ {1, 2}, is a market order to sell ec1
in exchange for either 1 or 2, according to which one will yield the most value in terms of the
personal relative price (i.e., “marginal utility”) system (p+1 , p
+
2 ).
The following are not restrictions on the characteristics of the economic agents but on
the rules of the game G[TxE ]. We shall see later on that they involve no loss of generality, in
the sense that, along a trajectory, no player would have any incentive to use strategies not
satisfying these restrictions.
Institutional Restrictions
1) ∀i ∈ I, #{c | eic > 0} ≤ 1.
2) ei ≤ xi for a.e. individual i.
1) exploits the idea that trades are anonymous, so that the only thing the market “sees”
are orders (“individuals”). Thus, it imposes that those orders are each an order for selling
at most a single good. (If a player wants to sell several different goods at the same time,
she just sends several different orders, each one with the same “utility” if she wishes so.)
Restriction 2 corresponds to the feasibility constraint traditionally imposed in the strategic
market games literature: Quantities offered for sale are thought of as being physically shown
or sent, so that a trader’s signal cannot exceed (componentwise) her collateral. And, here,
an agent i’s collateral is identified with her current endowment xi(t).
An order book in G[TxE ] can now be defined as a linear economy O =
(
I, I, µ, b, e)
verifying restrictions 1 and 2.
Remark that, even when E admits finitely many types of preferences and endowments, an
order book need not do so. Hence the need for the generality of Definition 2.2.1. supra.
For simplicity, we assume that an order immediately disappears once it has been sent,
whether it could be executed or not. This is innocuous since, whenever the corresponding
player still wants to send the same order at time t+ dt, she simply has to re-send it.30
30In other words, inexecuted orders are not stored in some order book. This restriction enables to get
rid of practical (and strategic) problems related to the time-to-execution of orders that are not immediately
executed. Indeed, it is found in Lo et al. (2002) that execution time is very sensitive to the limit-price, so that
in markets were orders are stored, submitting a limit-order is a trade-off between the advantage of obtaining
a fixed-price (by contrast with market orders) and the disadvantage of an unknown order execution time.
30
A market order to sell commodity k for commodity j is inexecutable if there exists a
partition of NC := {1, ..., C} into A ∪B such that j ∈ A, k ∈ B, and for every “agent” i,
(α) either eia = 0 ∀a ∈ A, (β) or bib = 0 ∀b ∈ B. Thus, weak irreducibility of an order
book amounts to the absence of inexecutable orders. Observe that, in the 2 × 2 case, all
market orders are executed in full and all limit orders are fully executed if the relative price
is sufficiently high, and not at all if this price is too low.
Now, the strategic market game G
[
TxE
]
obtains by defining as an outcome induced by
every strategy profile (or equivalently, every order book) the short-term outcome induced by
the linear economy corresponding to this order book.
The next result tells us the following: since there is a continuum of players in TxE ,
no market player can single-handedly influence prices, hence nobody has an incentive to
manipulate his preferences (revealed through the market orders sent to the market). Thus,
a strategy-proof profile of G
[
TxE
]
must induce an order book that is identical to TxE .
Lemma 6.1.— Under (C)-(i)-(ii), for every state x ∈ τ∗, the game G[TxE ] admits
a unique (a.e. sense) strategy-proof profile s, which is such that:
(
ϕ(s),Π(s)
) ≡ (ϕ(TxE),Π(TxE)) (a.e. sense) (15)
Proof. Let us call two orders redundant whenever one of them sells commodity c against
c′, while the other sells c′ against c at the same relative prices. The consolidation of two such
orders consists in replacing them by a single sell-order putting for sale the net amount of
commodity.
Now, consider a strategy sh of player h, consolidate the redundant orders, and organize
sh in C!(C−2)!2 baskets, one for each pair (c, c
′) of commodities. For each basket (c, c′), let
the value of the correspondence Shc,c′(p) at the relative price p of c against c
′ be the amount
proposed for sale of that good by player h if the relative price proposed by h for the pair
(c, c′) is smaller than, or equal to, p — and {0} otherwise. The resulting correspondences
Sc,c′(·) are upper semi-continuous (usc), non-decreasing in the price pc of commodity c,31 and
0-homogeneous with respect to (pc, pc′).
At the relative price p+c /p
+
c′ sent by player h, the corresponding value of the supply cor-
respondence is the interval [0, qc]. In any case, Shc,c′(·) takes non-empty, convex and compact
values. With these notations in hand, one sees that, in each marginal economy TxE , players
are actually playing in a game of “supply revelation”.32 Indeed, since their short-term pref-
erences are linear, their true short-term supply correspondence can be mimicked by means
of a single limit-price order for each pair (c, c′). According to Theorem 3.2.1, each player’s
payoff function is well-defined.
In this supply revelation game, it is her unique weakly dominant strategy for each in-
dividual h to announce her true short-term preferences-maximizing supply correspondence.
Indeed, announcing any other supply correspondence would make no difference to the re-
sulting short-term price, and so no difference to the induced infinitesimal budget constraint
(1) that individual i faces. The assumption (embedded in (C)) that each player’s gradient
is non-negative and no player has a zero gradient ∇xuh(x) at any state xh ∈ sXˆh implies
that revealing the truth will be the unique weakly dominant strategy of player i at each such
point. Indeed, announcing any other supply correspondence than the true one would lead i
to being possibly forced to receive some final short-term outcome that may not be optimal
with respect to her true short-term utility (at price q).
The linear economy corresponding to the order book s can be deduced from TxE by
“splitting” each player into each one of her orders (because of Restriction 1). TxE admits
a unique short-term outcome z˙ and some associated price pi, since, according to (C), every
player’s linear short-run utility is (weakly) increasing. Take such a pair (z˙, pi). Decompose
each player i’s net trade z˙i into a sum of vectors
31In the sense that every measurable selection is non-decreasing.
32This is an analogical reference to the term “demand revelation game”, first introduced by Tideman &
Tullock (1976, p. 1146) in a related, but distinct, context.
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z˙i =
∑
w`
having each a single negative and positive coordinate, and having zero value under pi. Con-
struct an action for player i consisting in sending each w` together with pi, as a limit-price
order. The action profile obtained by repeating this operation for each player induces the
original short-term outcome as final outcome. The Lemma then follows from the fact that a
short-term outcome is unaffected by the splitting operations made supra (see Remark 8 and
Prop. 5 (a) in section IV of Mertens (2003)).
¤
Armed with this game-theoretic retinterpretation of the micro-structure underlying our
dynamics, we can go back to Example 4.3.1 supra. Although there are trade opportunities
at e, no-trade is the unique reasonable issue from the point of view adopted in this paper
because the order corresponding to agent 1, having no counterpart, cannot be executed (even
partially). Indeed, as in any “real” market, for an order to be executed, there must be some
counterpart present on the market, and here there is none because agent 2 actually refuses
to sell commodity 1 in exchange for 2 (remember Remark 2.3.1??? above).
6.2 Further remarks
Obviously, the specific micro-structure used in this paper for infinitesimal trades is respon-
sible for most of the properties of the dynamics. This should not come as a surprise: the
indeterminacy of Smale’s (1976b) and Champsaur & Cornet’s (1990) exchange processes, and
more generally of non-taˆtonnement processes, suggests that at least some concrete specifi-
cation of the micro-structure involved in infinitesimal trades is needed if the theory is to
predict anything. Nevertheless, the limit-price mechanism requires a serious justification. Its
solution concept (called, here, “short-terme outcome”) can alternatively be viewed as:
(α) a strategy-proof equilibrium of a generalization of the standard double auction mech-
anism to the multiple commodity case.33 Thus, at any point in time, traders send limit-price
orders and market orders to the central agency, bids are matched with offers, and transactions
take place instantaneously. To simplify matters, we have assumed that there is a continuum
of players so that price manipulation disappears, and market players take prices as given. An
analysis of the imperfectly competitive case would go beyond the scope of the present paper.
An important step in this direction, however, have been made by Weyers (2000, 2003) where
Mertens’ limit-price mechanism is studied for 2-commodity (non-linear) economies populated
by finitely many agents.
(β) as a strategy-proof equilibrium of an extension of the Shapley windows model (see Sahi
& Yao (1989)). From this perspective, it inherits the well-established tradition of strategic
market games. In such games,34 prices are explicitly derived from the bids and offers that
players put on windows for each pair of goods available for trade. Mertens’ mechanism can be
understood as an extension of any such mechanism obtained by allowing traders to send not
only market orders but also limit-price orders to the market, i.e., orders that are conditional
upon the realized price (or, equivalently, exchange rates or personal prices at which the sender
of the order agrees to exchange one good for another).
(γ) There is yet another manner to understand our modelling approach of the interplay
between market forces in a marginal exchange economy. One appealing way to define the
direction in which our economy moves could consist in postulating that this direction will be
given by “the Walras equilibrium” of the corresponding marginal linear economy attached to
the current base point. This intuition, however, meets three major difficulties : (i) Firstly, it
may be the case that a linear marginal economy fail to admit any Walras equilibrium. This is
so, in particular, if it fails to verify the survival, or Slater, condition. (ii) Secondly, even when
they exist, and even though it is known from Gale (1976) that competitive equilibrium prices
33See, e.g., Wilson (1992) and Rustichini et alii (1994) for a characterization of double auctions as “optimal”
mechanisms.
34See, e.g., Giraud (2003a).
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are unique in a linear exchange economy, Walras equilibrium allocations may be indetermi-
nate. This is detrimental if we want to end up not with a differential inclusion but with a
standard differential equation with the hope of being able to recover some kind of uniqueness
of the solution trajectories. (iii) Thirdly, there is some kind of conceptual viciosus circulus
when defining an out-of-equilibrium dynamics by means of a sequence of short-run equilib-
ria... If so, why not content ourselves with the brute modelling force of a static equilibrium
?
In order to deal with the first difficulty (i), there is a literature devoted to generalizations
of the notion of Walras equilibrium (generally in terms of lexicographic or hierarchic prices).35
With respect to this question, the concept of pseudo-outcome we use in this paper (defined in
section 3.1), which is borrowed from Mertens (2003), amounts to replacing the mere Walras
equilibrium notion by a generalized one, where commodities with zero prices cannot be traded.
This prevents the budget correspondence to explode at such prices, and enables to recover
existence even when the survival assumption is not satisfied by the marginal economy under
scrutiny. (ii) Next, the proportional rule (see section 3.3. and Mertens (2003)) is one way
to solve the second difficulty just mentioned, as it enables to select a unique (generalized)
competitive equilibrium for every short-run economy. (iii) Third, Mertens’ solution concept
is not to be understood as an equilibrium state of the short-run economy (i.e., values of
individuals’ choices such that none of them has any incentive to modify his action) but as a
specific strategic outcome function mapping traders’ strategies (limit-price orders) at time t
into the space of directions in which the state of the economy will move from time t on.
In view of Lemma 4.1, one might be tempted to question the (apparently undue) gen-
erality of the setting used in subsection 2.2. for defining short-term outcomes: After all,
since all the fictitious linear economies induced by strategy-proof aggregate order books will
coincide (up to some “splitting operations”) with short-term economies, why should we pay
so much attention to the boundary of τL and/or to non-increasing preferences ? In view of
interpretation γ) of section 1.4, wouldn’t it suffice to restrict oneself to economies E satisfy-
ing a standard boundary condition36, and populated with agents having strictly monotonic
preferences, in order to content oneself with, say, familiar Walras equilibria as short-term
solution concept ? Our answer is threefold : a) even under the just mentioned additional
conditions, the non-uniqueness of Walras equilibrium allocations would call for the use of
some selection rule akin to the proportional rule of subsection 3.4, as soon as interpretation
α) or β) of section 1.4. is adopted ; b) from a game-theoretic viewpoint (i.e., still under either
α) or β)), the restriction to fictitious linear economies that can possibly arise as aggregate
strategy-proof order books makes sense only if the outcome of the marginal game G[TxE ] has
been defined out of a dominant strategy equilibrium, so that at least some definition of the
outcome induced for every order book is needed. c) Even if one is definitely not interested
in the game-theoretic foundation of our price-quantity adjustment dynamics (i.e., if one is
neither ready to take α) seriously, nor β)), the boundary condition just alluded to is utterly
unrealistic: As argued by Schecter (1977),37 in an Arrow-Debreu economy, “the definition [of
a commodity] is so specific, involving for example, location of the commodity and the time of
availability (see Debreu (1959)), that it is hard to imagine a reasonable state of a sufficiently
complicated economy that does not allocate zero of some commodity to some agent, i.e., that
does not lie in the boundary of that economy”. Therefore, in this paper this assumption will
be avoided as much as possible. As a consequence, given the possible non-existence of Walras
equilibria for non-interior endowments, one is lead to look to some generalized equilibrium
concept (interpretation β supra).
Now, in most of the papers devoted to non-taˆtonnement dynamics (including Smale (1976)
and Champsaur & Cornet (1990)), the dynamics reduces to a differential inclusion (in the
sense of Aubin & Cellina (1984)), whose right-member is upper-semi-continuous. Here, we
reduce our price-quantity adjustment dynamics to an ordinary differential equation (ODE),
which is a must if we want to recover some kind of uniqueness of the solution trajectory.
35See Florig (1998) and the references therein.
36Such as ∀h, Xˆh ∩ ∂τ = ∅.
37See also Smale (1974b).
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This ODE, however, has a discontinuous right-member, which forces us to use Filippov’s
(1988) solution concept. At this stage, one could wonder whether alternate trading rules
could not be thought of, that would yield more easy-to-handle vector fields. The answer to
this issue is threefold: given that some precise mechanism must be thought of, auctions and
strategic market games (i.e., interpretation α and β supra) are prominent ones. That a lack
of regularity is to be encountered at this stage is then but to be expected: every auction-
like market mechanism will induce some discontinuity of its allocational rule, which will
itself be responsible for the discontinuity of the resulting vector field — similarly for market
games. The limit-price mechanism is no exception. b) Mertens (2003) provides game-theoretic
justifications for the “solution concept” on which his mechanism is based, in terms of the
bargaining set of linear economies, as well as in terms of dividend games. c) Even if one favors
interpretation γ) above, discontinuity is unavoidable: The Walras correspondence itself failing
to be lower-hemi-continuous, none of the generalized Walras equilibrium correspondences
can be (and, in fact, is) lower-hemi-continuous. They therefore fail to admit any continuous
selection in general. Hence, in economic dynamics, discontinuity of the vector field is probably
something we must live with.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Some remarks on ODEs
We gather, here, two more or less well-known properties of ordinary differential equations
that prove instrumental when discussing the model to which this paper is devoted. First,
we prove that local uniqueness of trajectories can never obtained for an ODE unless global
uniqueness is guaranteed. Second, we recall some basic definitions for vector fields defined
on submanifolds with corners.
A. We consider a continuous mapping f : R2 → R, such that the Cauchy problem
x˙(t) = f(x, t), x(0) = 0 (16)
admits a least two distinct solutions. We claim that (16) must then admit an infinity of
distinct solutions. This shows that, in a dynamical economic setting, there is no analogue of
the generic finiteness result obtained for static Walras equilibria in Debreu (1970).
Let indeed x1, x2 : [0, a] → R be two distinct solutions, with a > 0 being chosen such that
x1(a) 6= x2(a). Let b be a real number chosen within the open interval (x1(a), x2(a)). Peano-Arze´la
theorem ensures that there exists a maximal solution to (16) crossing the point with coordinates (a, b),
and defined on some interval (τ, a]. Three cases are in order:
(i) If τ ≥ 0, then it must be the case that x(t)→∞ as t→ τ+. The intermediate value
theorem, applied to x − x1 and x − x2, then says that there exist some maximal real
numbers τ1, τ2 such that x(t) equals either x1(τ1) or x2(τ2). Suppose that x(t) = x1(τ1).
Then the map x˜(·) that equals x1 on [0, τ1] and x on [τ1, a] is a solution to (16), and is
distinct from both x1 and x2.
(ii) If τ < 0 and x(0) 6= 0, then the graph of x must intersect that of x1 or x2, and one is
lead to the same conclusion as at the end of (i).
(iii) If x(0) = 0, then x is a solution to (16), distinct from both x1 and x2.
In every case, there exist at least three distinct solutions to (16), and one concludes inductively
on the number of solutions.
B. By definition, a manifold with corners M is a set such that every point p ∈ M has
coordinate neighborhoods that are diffeomorphic to [0,+∞)k × Rn−k, where n =dimM ,
k = k(p) is the codimension of the face containing p, and p corresponds to 0 under this
isomorphism. The transitions between such coordinate neighborhoods must be smooth up to
the boundary. Every ∂ manifold (i.e., manifold with boundary) is a manifold with corners.
An open face is a path component of the set ∂kM of all points p with the same fixed k =
k(p). The closure in M of an open face is called a boundary face or, simply, a face. If
it is of codimension 1, it may be called specifically a boundary hypersurface. In general,
such a boundary hypersurface does not have a covering by coordinate neighborhoods of the
type just described because they admit boundary points. (Somewhat imprecisely, the main
complication arising when one deals with manifolds with corners instead of mere ∂-manifolds
is that the former admit boundaries which themselves have a non-empty boundary.)
To avoid the problem just mentioned, we demand, as part of the definition of a manifold
with corners, that the boundary hypersurfaces be embedded. This means that we assume
that, for each boundary hypersurface F of M , there is a smooth function ρF ≥ 0 on M , such
that:
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F =
{
ρF = 0
}
, ∇ρF 6= 0. (17)
If p ∈ F0, a face of codimension k, then exactly k of the ρF vanish at p. Denoting them
ρ1, ..., ρk, then (∇ρi)i=1,...,k must be linearly independent at p. It follows that the addition
of some k functions with independent differentials at p on F0 gives a coordinate system near
p.38 The model space Rn+ is a manifold with corners in the restricted sense given to it in this
paper.
A careful reading of Smale (1974b) reveals that the whole analysis made there holds for
submanifolds with corners in the sense of this paper.
Let M be a k-dimensional submanifold with corners of Rn, x ∈ M . The tangent space
TxM is defined to be the (k-dimensional) subspace of TxRn generated by
{
v ∈ TxRn : ∃φ ∈
C1([0, ε),M) with ε > 0, φ(0) = x and φ′(x) = v}. For instance, T(1,0,...,0)Rn+ is the line
{x ∈ Rn | x2 = ... = xn = 0}, while T(0,0,...,0)Rn+ = {0}.
Every k-dimensional submanifold with cornersM of Rn is contained in a C∞ k-dimensional
submanifold of Rn. A function f fromM into a differentiable manifold Q is said to be Cs if it
can be extended to a Cs-function defined on a k-dimensional submanifold of Rn. For x ∈M ,
Df(x) : TxM → Tf(x)Q is independent of the extension. The same holds for vector fields.
A point x in a k-dimensional submanifold with corners M is said to be of depth d,
0 ≤ k ≤ d, if every neighborhood of x in M contains a smaller neighborhood of x that
is diffeomorphic to Rd+×Rk−d. A stratum ofM is a connected component of the set of points
of depth d. M is the disjoint union of its strata. If S1 and S2 are two strata of M with
S1 ∩ S2 6= ∅, then S1 ⊂ S2.39
7.2 Link between pseudo-outcomes and WE
We consider a linear economy L as in section 2.1. WE(L) denotes the set of Walras equilibria
of L, whose definition is recalled for the sake of completeness: (x, p) ∈ L1(I, µ) × RC+ is a
Walras equilibrium (WE) if
∫
I xidµ(i) = ω and for µ-a.e. i, xi maximizes b
i · y over y ∈ RC+
subject to the constraint: p · y ≤ p · ei.
Obviously, every pseudo-outcome verifying the following property is a WE: ∀c, pc = 0⇒
bic = 0 for a.e. i. In particular, every pseudo-outcome price vector with full support is a WE
price. In order to clarify the converse inclusion, we need a weak additional restriction:
Assumption A1 For every commodity c, there exists some “agent” i such that bi` > 0
and for all i, bi > 0.
We have:
Proposition 6.2.1. (Mertens (1996, Claims A and B, p.32-33) Under A1 every WE of
L is a pseudo-outcome.
That the preceding “equivalence” property fails when A1 is not fulfilled is illustrated by
the following examples (borrowed from Mertens (2003)):
Example 6.2.1. b1 = (0, 0), e1 = b2 = (1, 0), e2 = b3 = e3 = (0, 1). (1, 1) is the unique
WE price. Yet P (L) = {(λ, 0) | λ > 0} contains no WE price.
7.3 The weak irreducibility hypothesis
The next examples illustrate the relationship between the “weak irreducibility hypothesis”
of linear economies and related notions already available in the literature.
Example 6.3.1. If for µ a.e. i, bi >> 0, the economy is weakly irreducible. Similarly if
ei >> 0 µ-a.e. i.
38Manifolds with corners verifying this additional regularity assumption are called 〈n〉-manifolds, e.g., by
Laures (2004).
39Notice that the closure of a stratum need not be a submanifold with corners.
The Limit-price Dynamics 37
Example 6.3.2. (Gale (1957)) An economy is irreducible if there do not exist proper
subsets T of the set of consumers NN and L of the set of goods NC such that ei` = 0 whenever
(i, `) ∈ T × L and bi` = 0 whenever i /∈ T and ` /∈ L.
Every irreducible economy is weakly irreducible, the converse being false: b1 = (1, 1), e1 =
(0, 1), b2 = (1, 0), e2 = (1, 1).
Example 6.3.3. (Gale (1976)) A subset S ⊂ NN is self-sufficient (s-s) if ∀s ∈ S,
bks > 0⇒ eks′ = 0 ∀s′ /∈ S. S is super self-sufficient (ss-s) if, in addition, ∃(s0, k) ∈ S×NC s.t.
eks > 0 but b
k
t = 0 ∀t ∈ S. The absence of ss− s subset is known to be a necessary condition
for existence of WE (Gale (1976)), and implies that the economy is weakly irreducible. The
converse is, again, false: b1 = (0, 0), e1 = (1, 0), b2 = (1, 1), e2 = (0, 1).
7.4 More on Filippov’s solutions.
Here are simple examples of discontinuous vector fields, where one sees Filippov’s solution
concept at work.
Example 6.4.1. Consider the vector field on the real line:
g(x) =
{
1 if x ≥ 0,
−1 if x < 0.
Filippov’s multifunction G is:
G(x) =

{1} if x ≥ 0,
[-1,1] if x = 0,
{−1} if x < 0.
The set of Filippov’s solutions to the Cauchy problem associated with this vector field
and with initial data x(0) = 0 consists of all functions of the form:
x(t) =
{
0 if t ≤ τ
t− τ if t > τ
together with all the functions of the form:
x(t) =
{
0 if t ≤ τ
τ − t if t > τ
for any τ ≥ 0.
Example 6.4.2. On the plane, consider the vector field:
g(x, y) =

(0,−1) if y > 0,
(0, 1) if y < 0,
(1, 0) if y = 0.
The corresponding Filippov’s set-valued map is
G(x, y) =

{(0,−1)} if y > 0,
{(0, 1)} if y < 0,
co{(0, 1), (0, 1), (1, 0)} if y = 0.
Therefore, the unique Filippov’s solution starting from the origin is the function x(t) = (0, 0)
for all t ≥ 0. This second example is not innocuous: in the smooth 2×2 case, when linearizing
the submanifold θ around some Pareto-optimal allocation x ∈ θ, one gets exactly the same
picture. This provides the intuition for Lemma 5.1.
Ha´jek (1979) compares Filippov’s solution concept with other notions, due to Krasovskii
and Hermes, and with the classical ones (Newton and Carathe´odory solutions). An alternative
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definition of solutions for differential equations with discontinuous right-hand side has been
proposed by Sentis (1978). Sentis solution is defined exactly as a Filippov solution except
that one does not take the convex hull in Definition 3.4.1. Clearly, every trade curve in the
Sentis sense would be a trade curve in the sense given to this word in this paper. In general,
the converse does not hold, but we know from Theorem 4.3.1 that, generically, the difference
between both solution concepts does not matter. Whether it would be advantageous to adopt
Sentis’ (smaller) solution rather than Filippov’s in order to deal with the non-generic case is
left for further investigation.
7.5 Finitely sub-analytic economies
Here, we recall some technical background material needed for the understanding of Theorem
4.3.1 above.
The appropriate mathematical set-up for introducing the class of finitely subanalytic
economies is that of 0-minimal Tarski systems (see Coste (2000), Blume & Zame (1989) and
Giraud (2000)). However, we refrain from striving for the utmost generality, and content
ourselves with the more modest class of finitely subanalytic sets — which is quite sufficient
for our purposes.
A subset X ⊂ Rn is semi-analytic if, for each y ∈ Rn, there is an open neighborhood U of
y such that U∩X is the finite union of sets defined by real analytic equalities and inequalities.
Formally, U ∩X is the finite disjoint union of sets of the form {x | fi(x) = αi, gj(x) > βj , 1 ≤
i ≤M, 1 ≤ j ≤ N}, where fi and gj : Rn → R are real-analytic functions.
A subset X ⊂ Rn is subanalytic if, for each y ∈ Rn, there is an open neighborhood V of
y and a bounded semi-analytic set Y ⊂ Rn+m such that V ∩X is the image of Y under the
canonical projection onto the first n coordinates.
A subset X ⊂ Rn is finitely subanalytic if it is the image under the map:
(x1, ..., xn) 7→
( x1√
1 + x21
, ...,
xn√
1 + x2n
)
of a subanalytic subset of Rn.
A function f : Rn → Rm is said to be finitely subanalytic (resp. semi-analytic, subana-
lytic) whenever its graph, Graph f ⊂ Rn+m, is so.
A subclass of the category of finitely subanalytic sets is provided by the semi-algebraic sets,
i.e., those that are obtained from the definition of a semi-analytic set after having replaced
“real-analytic” by “polynomial”. Many transcendental functions are finitely subanalytic but
not semi-algebraic: so are the restrictions of the exponential function, the logarithm and
the trigonometric functions to compact subsets of their domains. Compositions, algebraic
combinations, and derivatives of finitely subanalytic (resp. semi-algebraic) functions are
finitely subanalytic (resp. semi-algebraic), but indefinite integrals are not. Neither are the
exponential, the logarithm and the trigonometric functions on their entire domains.
